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INTRODUCTION 
EDERAL common law causes of action—actions created neither by 
Congress nor by state law—have long generated debate among 
judges and scholars. In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme 
Court famously rejected “federal general common law.”1 Nonetheless, 
the Court has cautiously embraced several specific enclaves of federal 
common law over the ensuing decades.2 The question of federal judicial 
power to recognize federal common law causes of action arises in a 
range of contexts in the field of federal courts. For instance, may federal 
courts recognize an implied cause of action for the violation of a federal 
statute that does not itself create a cause of action? Relatedly, may fed-
eral courts recognize an implied cause of action for the violation of the 
Constitution when neither the Constitution nor a federal statute specifi-
cally creates one? Although courts and scholars continue to debate these 
questions, they have not reached a consensus on how to resolve them. 
Recently, the power of federal courts to recognize federal common 
law causes of action has emerged as a key question under the Alien Tort 
Statute (“ATS”).3 Congress enacted the ATS in 1789 as part of the First 
Judiciary Act. The ATS grants federal courts subject matter jurisdiction 
over claims by aliens for torts in violation of the law of nations, but cre-
ates no cause of action itself.4 In the last decade, the Supreme Court has 
twice interpreted the ATS and, in the process, has suggested that, alt-
hough the statute is purely jurisdictional, federal courts have limited 
power to recognize a small handful of federal common law causes of ac-
tion when exercising this jurisdiction.5 
Over time, judges and scholars have reached different conclusions in 
different contexts about the power of federal courts to recognize federal 
common law. From the Founding through the nineteenth century, the 
Supreme Court did not recognize any “federal common law”—that is, 
“federal rules of decision whose content cannot be traced directly by 
traditional methods of interpretation to federal statutory or constitutional 
 
1 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
2 See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1264–66 (1996); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And the New 
Federal Common Law, 39. N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 407–09 (1964). 
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
4 Id. 
5 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013); Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004). 
F
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commands.”6 To be sure, in certain cases, exemplified by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Swift v. Tyson,7 early federal courts applied general 
law—a transnational source of law that included the law merchant, the 
law maritime, and the law of state-state relations. General law, however, 
did not preempt contrary state law or create causes of action. Moreover, 
general law was not federal common law. Unlike modern federal com-
mon law, general law neither supported federal question jurisdiction nor 
preempted contrary state law. The Supreme Court stopped applying gen-
eral law as such in 1938 when it held in Erie that “[t]here is no federal 
general common law.”8 Nonetheless, following Erie, the Court recog-
nized several distinct “enclaves” of federal common law. In recent dec-
ades, the Court has been reluctant to recognize new enclaves because of 
concerns that judicial creation of federal common law is in tension with 
Erie, and with principles of separation of powers and federalism more 
generally.9 
Against this background, the Supreme Court interpreted the ATS for 
the first time in 2004. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Court concluded 
that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of ac-
tion.”10 Nonetheless, the Court believed that “[t]he jurisdictional grant is 
best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the common 
law would provide a cause of action for the modest number of interna-
tional law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”11 
The Court rested this belief on the assumption that the First Congress 
would have understood “the ambient law of the era” to provide the caus-
es of action that federal courts would adjudicate in exercising their ATS 
jurisdiction.12 In other words, the Court “assume[d] that the First Con-
gress understood that the district courts would recognize private causes 
of action,” derived from ambient law, “for certain torts in violation of 
the law of nations.”13 On the basis of this assumption, the Court suggest-
 
6 Richard H. Fallon Jr., John F. Manning, Daniel J. Meltzer & David L. Shapiro, Hart and 
Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System 607 (6th ed. 2009) [hereinafter Hart 
& Wechsler]; see Henry P. Monaghan, Supremacy Clause Textualism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 
731, 741 (2010) (“The modern conception of federal common law—judge-made law that 
binds both federal and state courts—simply did not exist circa 1788.”).  
7 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). 
8 304 U.S. at 78. 
9 Clark, supra note 2, at 1248–50. 
10 542 U.S. at 724. 
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 714. 
13 Id. at 724. 
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ed that federal courts today may “recognize private claims under federal 
common law” for a narrow range of international law violations.14 
Commentators have generally embraced Sosa’s vision of ambient law 
and federal judicial power at the Founding with little independent histor-
ical analysis or verification.15 
In fact, the claim that early federal courts relied on “the common law” 
in the abstract to supply causes of action in civil suits rests on a false 
historical premise. Ambient or general law neither supplied nor was un-
derstood by the Founders to supply the cause of action in civil cases (in-
cluding ATS cases) within the jurisdiction of early federal courts. Ra-
ther, Congress enacted specific statutes that prescribed the civil causes 
of action available in federal courts, as well as related matters. Although 
the full import of these statutes is largely overlooked today, they provide 
important context for understanding the kind of judicial power that fed-
eral courts exercised within their limited subject matter jurisdiction. 
Members of the First Congress considered and debated many aspects of 
federal judicial power over civil disputes—including whether litigants 
would enjoy the right to a jury trial,16 how expansively federal courts 
would exercise equity jurisdiction,17 how expensive and otherwise in-
convenient federal litigation would be,18 and how federal courts would 
order executions on their judgments.19 In addition to these questions, but 
integrally related to them, Congress considered and provided the source 
of the causes of action available in federal court. The resolution of all 
these questions depended in large part on the forms of proceeding that 
federal courts generally would use in civil cases. Congress addressed 
these questions by enacting a series of early federal statutes that speci-
fied the forms and modes of proceeding that federal courts were to ap-
ply. 
 
14 Id. at 732. 
15 See infra notes 78–81 and accompanying text. 
16 See, e.g., 1 Annals of Cong. 85–86 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. 
Burke) [hereinafter Documentary History of the First Federal Congress] (expressing concern 
with measures that “will materially affect the trial by jury”). 
17 See Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity, and 
Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 Duke L.J. 249, 269 (2010) (describing Members’ 
distrust of equity). 
18 1 Annals of Cong. at 814 (statement of Rep. Livermore). 
19 See, e.g., id. at 839–44 (statement of Rep. Stone) (expressing concern with the manner 
in which executions would proceed on federal court judgments). 
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To understand these statutes, one must understand the status of the 
common law in the United States prior to their enactment. Before the 
Constitution was adopted, state courts generally relied on common law 
forms of proceeding to adjudicate cases before them. During British 
rule, the colonies had applied common law as British law. After inde-
pendence, the individual states chose to adopt the common law as state 
law. Each of the original thirteen states took action to receive the com-
mon law—including its forms and modes of proceeding—by statute, 
constitutional provision, or judicial decision. The resulting state law 
forms of proceeding defined the remedies that were available to plain-
tiffs for particular wrongs, and how state courts would determine a 
plaintiff’s right to a particular remedy. In other words, the traditional 
forms of proceeding adopted by the states defined the causes of action 
available to plaintiffs and the procedures to be used for adjudicating 
them. Over time, individual states molded these forms of proceeding in 
response to local circumstances, resulting in variations among state 
causes of action. 
Accordingly, when Congress exercised its power to create lower fed-
eral courts in 1789,20 there was no single body of “common law” that 
applied throughout the United States. Congress made no attempt to fol-
low the states’ lead by adopting its own version of the common law as a 
whole for the nation, in part because any such attempt would have ex-
ceeded enumerated federal powers as then understood. Nor did Congress 
adopt uniform forms of proceeding for use in federal court, apparently 
because it was unable (or unwilling) to do so.21 Rather, in the Process 
Acts of 1789 and 1792, Congress instructed inferior federal courts adju-
dicating common law suits to borrow the forms and modes of proceed-
ing then in use by the states in which they sat. In this legislation, Con-
gress balanced the need to create an effective federal judiciary with a 
desire to heed anti-Federalist concerns about consolidated national pow-
er at the expense of the states.22 Members of Congress argued that the 
 
20 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 9, 18.  
21 See 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, 
at 112 (Maeva Marcus et al. eds., 1992) (describing the “inability or unwillingness” of the 
First Congress “to agree on uniform rules for the operation of the federal courts”).  
22 See id. at 108 (explaining that in framing a federal court system “those who favored a 
strong, centralized federal court system had to contend with those who feared a loss of au-
tonomy by the individual states”); see also 1 Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme Court 
of the United States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801, at 492, 510 (Paul A. Freund ed., 
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interests of the people would be “more secure under the legal paths of 
their ancestors, under their modes of trial, and known methods of deci-
sion.”23 Accordingly, the First Congress established a “species of conti-
nuity” with diverse state practices by adopting the forms of proceeding 
of each state as the governing forms of proceeding for federal courts lo-
cated in that state.24 In cases in equity and admiralty, the First Congress 
directed federal courts to use the traditional forms of proceeding that ap-
plied in such cases. In doing so, Congress did not leave federal courts 
free to derive the causes of action they would employ from “ambient 
law.” Rather, Congress specifically adopted several preexisting, well-
developed bodies of law for use in federal court. 
This original source of the cause of action in federal courts has been 
largely forgotten by today’s lawyers and judges, not only because it is 
no longer relevant to their work, but also because modern legal sensibili-
ties no longer identify “process” as the source of a “cause of action.”25 
 
1971) (describing the tension between consolidated federal court system and anti-Federalist 
concerns). 
23 1 Annals of Cong. at 833 (statement of Rep. Jackson); see also id. at 858 (statement of 
Rep. Stone) (describing mischiefs if state and federal courts had different modes of execu-
tions); Bank of the U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 59 (1825) (“This course was no 
doubt adopted, as one better calculated to meet the views and wishes of the several States, 
than for Congress to have framed an entire system for the Courts of the United States, vary-
ing from that of the States Courts.”). 
24 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 458; see also id. at 473 (describing “the localization of the 
federal inferior courts”). 
25 Although courts and scholars have largely left unexamined the relationship between the 
Process Acts and the causes of action available in federal courts, certain scholars have exam-
ined federal judicial and legislative power over modern matters of procedure in light of the 
Process Acts. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 Va. L. Rev. 813, 864–
76 (2008) (discussing the Process Acts in examining whether federal courts have an inherent 
authority to govern their own procedure absent legislation from Congress); Amy Coney Bar-
rett, The Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 324, 368–71 (2006) 
(discussing the Process Acts in examining the inherent supervisory power of the Supreme 
Court); Benjamin H. Barton, An Article I Theory of the Inherent Powers of the Federal 
Courts, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1, 23–27 (2011) (describing the Process Act and the Judiciary 
Act as reflecting the proposition that “the first Congress considered its Article I power over 
court process and procedure to be plenary”); Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judi-
cially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 405, 414–16 
(2008) (considering the respective responsibilities of Congress and courts in crafting proce-
dural rules); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural 
Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 747–51 (2001) (discussing the framework of the Process 
Act of 1789); William F. Ryan, Rush to Judgment: A Constitutional Analysis of Time Limits 
on Judicial Decisions, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 761, 770–75 (1997) (arguing that both history and 
precedent reveal that the legislature and not the courts had primary control over court proce-
dure).  
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When Congress adopted the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, however, 
legal and equitable forms of proceeding defined the specific causes of 
action available to litigants. In light of this background, the First Con-
gress contemplated that federal courts would hear only those causes of 
action already available under existing legal and equitable forms of pro-
ceeding. At the time, lawyers, judges, and other public officials under-
stood that these forms of proceeding—not ambient law—defined the 
causes of action available to litigants. Once established, this connection 
would have been sufficiently obvious to members of the First Congress 
and the judiciary that it warranted little, if any, discussion. 
This background has important implications for interpreting the ATS. 
The Supreme Court has self-consciously sought to identify and imple-
ment the First Congress’s understanding of the ATS. The Court has pro-
ceeded, however, on the false premise that the First Congress assumed 
that federal courts would adopt causes of action in ATS cases by looking 
to “the ‘brooding omnipresence’ of the common law then thought dis-
coverable by reason.”26 The Process Acts demonstrate that the First 
Congress made no such assumption. Instead, the Process Acts instructed 
federal courts adjudicating any of the legal claims over which they had 
subject matter jurisdiction—including ATS claims—to apply the forms 
of proceedings used by the courts of the state in which they sat. Neither 
early congressional legislation nor early federal judicial practice sup-
ports the Supreme Court’s suggestion that courts today should employ 
novel—and artificially narrow—federal common law causes of action in 
ATS cases. To the contrary, long-standing historical practice suggests 
that state law may continue to define the causes of action available when 
federal courts exercise jurisdiction under the ATS—not under the now-
defunct Process Acts, but under Erie and the Rules of Decision Act. 
This Article will proceed as follows. Part I will describe how the Su-
preme Court has recently interpreted the ATS to authorize the creation 
of limited federal common law causes of action. The Court’s approach is 
based on the mistaken historical premise that the ambient law of the 
era—rather than the Process Acts—would have supplied the causes of 
action available to early federal courts exercising jurisdiction under the 
ATS. 
 
26 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 722 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting)).  
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Part II will describe how the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792 adopted 
state forms of proceeding in cases at law and traditional forms of pro-
ceeding in equity and admiralty as the causes of action available in 
federal court. The Process Acts marked a victory for opponents of ex-
pansive federal judicial power, especially insofar as the Acts required 
federal courts to follow state forms of proceeding in common law cases. 
Part III will describe how early federal courts understood their author-
ity to entertain legal and equitable causes of action. In a range of con-
texts across jurisdictional grants, federal courts adjudicated only those 
causes of action authorized by the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, ab-
sent contrary instructions from Congress in other statutes. 
Part IV will describe some of the implications of this history for the 
source of the cause of action in ATS cases. Although this Article will 
not attempt to work out all of the implications of the history it presents, 
this Part will use the ATS to illustrate how a proper understanding of the 
original source of the cause of action in federal court can both inform 
and transform debates over federal judicial power. 
I. THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN ATS CASES 
The ATS is a jurisdictional provision originally adopted as part of 
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. As enacted, it provided that “the 
district courts . . . shall . . . have cognizance, concurrent with the courts 
of the several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all 
causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of na-
tions or a treaty of the United States.”27 Although Section 9 gave federal 
courts jurisdiction over these “causes,” it did not define the causes or 
specify the source of law that would define them. Litigants and courts 
rarely invoked the statute for almost 200 years. In the 1980s, litigants 
and courts rediscovered the ATS, invoking it to adjudicate cases be-
tween aliens arising outside of the United States.28 At first, some lower 
federal courts suggested that customary international law itself could 
supply the cause of action in such cases. The Supreme Court, however, 
declined to adopt this position in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.29 Instead, the 
Court indicated that federal courts could recognize only a limited num-
 
27 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (2012)).  
28 See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
29 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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ber of federal common law causes of action that corresponded to a nar-
row set of examples that the Court believed the First Congress might 
have had in mind when it enacted the ATS. The Court justified this ap-
proach on the ground that early federal courts applying the ATS would 
have found causes of action in ambient common law. Because Erie 
abandoned general common law in 1938, the Sosa Court suggested that 
courts today may use federal common law to fill the void. 
This Part will describe in more detail how lower federal courts and 
the Supreme Court have interpreted the ATS—and, in particular, how 
they have defined the source of the cause of action in ATS cases. Be-
cause the Sosa Court attempted to identify and implement the expecta-
tions of the First Congress, this Part will begin by discussing the original 
role and meaning of the ATS in the First Judiciary Act. As the remainder 
of this Article will explain, both the Supreme Court and the lower feder-
al courts have failed to identify correctly how the First Congress would 
have understood the source of the cause of action in ATS cases. 
A. The Original Function of the ATS 
In other work, we have explained that the First Congress included the 
ATS in the Judiciary Act of 1789 as a form of foreign diversity jurisdic-
tion.  This jurisdiction provided aliens with the option of suing Ameri-
cans in federal (as opposed to state) court for intentional torts of vio-
lence against their person or personal property.30 In so doing, the ATS 
satisfied the United States’ obligation under the law of nations to redress 
such harms. Although one need not accept this understanding of the 
ATS to appreciate how the Sosa Court misidentified the source of the 
cause of action in ATS cases, we offer a brief summary in order to place 
these issues in their full historical context. Under the law of nations, a 
nation became responsible for an intentional tort of violence that its citi-
zen committed against the person or personal property of a friendly alien 
if the tortfeasor’s nation did not redress the harm in one of three ways. 
The nation could criminally punish the offender, extradite the offender 
to the victim’s nation, or provide a civil remedy to the foreign victim.31 
If the offender’s nation failed to redress the injury in one of these ways, 
 
30 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of 
Nations, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 445 (2011) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute and 
Law of Nations] (analyzing the original meaning of the ATS). 
31 See id. at 474–75. 
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the victim’s nation had just cause to retaliate against the offender’s na-
tion, including by waging war.32 
Following the United States’ independence from Great Britain, vio-
lence by Americans against aliens (especially British subjects returning 
to recover their debts and property) posed a threat to the peace and secu-
rity of the new nation. During the Confederation era, Congress urged the 
states to redress such violence by their citizens, but only Connecticut en-
acted legislation for this purpose. In addition, state courts and juries 
were notorious for favoring Americans over British subjects in the years 
immediately following the War of Independence. With the adoption of 
the Constitution in 1789, Congress obtained the means to bypass the 
states and redress such violence at the federal level. Congress could have 
made all violence by Americans against friendly aliens a federal crime, 
but this would have placed the decision whether to prosecute in the 
hands of federal officials who were not yet in place. In addition, criminal 
actions would not have redressed violence committed by U.S. citizens in 
other nations because at the time criminal jurisdiction could not reach 
acts committed abroad. In the alternative, Congress could have encour-
aged the President to extradite Americans who committed serious torts 
against aliens abroad, but the United States did not yet have extradition 
treaties with other nations. 
Under these circumstances, the First Congress chose to satisfy the 
United States’ obligation to redress such violence by allowing aliens to 
pursue a civil remedy for it in the newly minted federal courts. When 
Congress created lower federal courts, it gave them jurisdiction to hear 
claims by aliens for torts in violation of the law of nations. This was a 
shorthand way of referring to torts committed by Americans against al-
iens which, if not redressed, were attributable to the United States as a 
violation of the law of nations. Article III of the Constitution authorized 
this jurisdictional grant as a species of foreign diversity jurisdiction. In 
theory, some of these alien tort cases might have fallen within the feder-
al courts’ standard foreign diversity jurisdiction. As a practical matter, 
however, the five-hundred-dollar amount-in-controversy requirement for 
ordinary foreign diversity jurisdiction would have left most alien tort 
cases in state court. The ATS filled this gap because it lacked an 
amount-in-controversy requirement. Accordingly, the ATS allowed fed-
eral courts to hear all claims by all aliens who suffered an intentional in-
 
32 See id. at 476–77. 
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jury to person or personal property at the hands of Americans, thereby 
ensuring that the United States would meet its obligation under the law 
of nations to redress such injuries.33 
B. The ATS in the Lower Federal Courts 
For reasons that are not entirely clear, aliens rarely invoked jurisdic-
tion under the ATS in the decades following its enactment, at least in 
recorded cases. In some instances, aliens subject to violence at the hands 
of Americans may have left the country rather than remain and pursue 
legal redress.34 At the same time, commercial relations improved in 
some respects between the United States and Great Britain, especially 
after the Jay Treaty of 1794.35 The treaty both strengthened trade be-
tween the two nations and resolved American debts to British creditors. 
Although tensions endured between the two nations, American mer-
chants increasingly came to embrace British subjects as important trad-
ing partners, rather than as enemies. In turn, British subjects may have 
been content to pursue ordinary tort remedies in state court rather than 
invoke the federal courts’ ATS jurisdiction. Perhaps for these reasons, 
federal courts mentioned the ATS in only two early cases—Moxon v. 
The Fanny (decided in 1793)36 and Bolchos v. Darrel (decided in 
1795).37 Neither case sheds much light on the scope of ATS jurisdic-
tion38 because both were libel actions—a traditional form of action in 
admiralty—that fell within the federal courts’ independent grant of ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction. 
The ATS remained essentially dormant for almost two centuries until 
1980, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit invoked 
the statute in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.39 There, the court allowed citizens 
 
33 From this perspective, both the ATS and the general foreign diversity provision of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 were distinct exercises of Article III foreign diversity jurisdiction. The 
ATS was limited to suits by aliens for torts in violation of the law of nations, but had no 
amount-in-controversy requirement. The general foreign diversity provision encompassed all 
suits between aliens and Americans, but had a strict amount-in-controversy requirement. For 
extensive treatment of the matters discussed in this section, see Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort 
Statute and Law of Nations, supra note 30. 
34 See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute and Law of Nations, supra note 30, at 525. 
35 Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Nov. 19, 1794, 8 Stat. 116. 
36 17 F. Cas. 942, 947–48 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9,895). 
37 3 F. Cas. 810, 810–11 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607).   
38 See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute and Law of Nations, supra note 30, at 458–59, 
459 n.56. 
39 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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of Paraguay to sue another citizen of Paraguay for torturing and killing 
their son in Paraguay. The court concluded that “deliberate torture per-
petrated under color of official authority violates universally accepted 
norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the nation-
ality of the parties.”40 The court found that the ATS conferred federal ju-
risdiction over the case because an alien was suing for a tort in violation 
of the law of nations.41 Because the suit was solely between aliens, how-
ever, it did not obviously fall within the limited subject matter jurisdic-
tion conferred by Article III. The Second Circuit resolved this problem 
by asserting that the law of nations “has always been part of the federal 
common law.”42 On this view, the court determined that customary in-
ternational law both provided the cause of action and supported federal 
question jurisdiction under Article III. 
Four years later, the D.C. Circuit declined to apply the Second Cir-
cuit’s approach when it decided Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.43 Is-
raeli citizens sued the Palestine Liberation Organization (“PLO”), Libya, 
and several other organizations, alleging that they were responsible for 
an armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel that killed and injured numer-
ous civilians and thus amounted to several torts in violation of the law of 
nations (including terrorism, torture, and genocide).44 The D.C. Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint in a per curiam opinion, with all 
three judges writing separate concurrences. Judge Edwards seemed to 
favor Filartiga’s approach to the ATS, but emphasized that the statute 
allowed federal courts to hear only a narrow range of cases alleging vio-
lations of established international law—such as genocide, slavery, and 
systematic racial discrimination. Judge Edwards concluded that the 
PLO’s actions against civilians did not rise to the level of a claim under 
the statute.45 Judge Robb concurred on the ground that the dispute pre-
sented a nonjusticiable political question because courts should leave 
 
40 Id.  
41 See id. at 878–79. 
42 Id. at 885–86. Filartiga’s assertion that the law of nations “has always been part of the 
federal common law” is anachronistic and inconsistent with the way in which early federal 
courts understood the law of nations. See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute and Law of Na-
tions, supra note 30, at 547–48. 
43 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 781, 796 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
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politically sensitive issues, such as the international legal status of ter-
rorism, to the executive branch for diplomatic resolution.46 
In a widely cited opinion, Judge Bork concluded that the ATS was 
solely a jurisdictional statute that conferred no cause of action. In the 
course of his opinion, Judge Bork made several important points that 
correctly anticipated certain aspects of the Supreme Court’s subsequent 
interpretation of the ATS.47 First, he addressed the source of the cause of 
action in ATS cases. He maintained that “it is essential that there be an 
explicit grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff be allowed to 
enforce principles of international law in a federal tribunal.”48 Second, 
he stressed the constitutional separation of powers. In his view, “The 
crucial element of the doctrine of separation of powers in this case is the 
principle that ‘[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government 
is committed by the Constitution to the Executive and Legislative—‘the 
political’—Departments.’”49 Third, Judge Bork offered some thoughts 
regarding the original meaning of the ATS. He began by rejecting 
Filartiga’s broad reading of the statute to authorize a cause of action 
whenever a plaintiff alleges a violation of international law. Judge Bork 
found no evidence that Congress intended Filartiga’s broad reading 
when it enacted the statute.50 Accordingly, he interpreted the statute 
more narrowly in light of the Founders’ goal of opening “federal courts 
to aliens for the purpose of avoiding, not provoking, conflicts with other 
nations.”51  
Although it was unnecessary to his decision, Judge Bork offered some 
speculative thoughts regarding “what [the ATS] may have been enacted 
to accomplish.”52 He looked to Blackstone—“a writer certainly familiar 
to colonial lawyers”—and explained that Blackstone identified three 
principal offenses against the law of nations incorporated by the law of 
England: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambas-
sadors, and piracy.53 According to Judge Bork, “[o]ne might suppose 
 
46 Id. at 826–27 (Robb, J., concurring). 
47 See Bradford R. Clark, Tel-Orin, Filartiga, and the Meaning of the Alien Tort Statute, 
80 U. Chi. L. Rev. Dialogue 177, 177 (2013). 
48 Tel-Orin, 726 F.2d at 801 (Bork, J., concurring). 
49 Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 
302 (1918)).  
50 Id. at 811–16. 
51 Id. at 812.  
52 Id. at 813. 
53 Id.  
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that these were the kinds of offenses for which Congress wished to pro-
vide tort jurisdiction for suits by aliens in order to avoid conflicts with 
other nations.”54 Lower federal courts continued to struggle with the 
meaning of the ATS prior to the Supreme Court’s 2004 decision in Sosa. 
C. The ATS in the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court interpreted the ATS for the first time in 2004, and 
concluded that the only causes of action that federal courts may adjudi-
cate under the statute are those that courts recognize as a matter of fed-
eral common law. In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,55 Alvarez (a doctor who 
was a Mexican national) sued Sosa (a fellow Mexican national), other 
Mexican nationals, four agents of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency 
(“DEA”), and the United States for kidnapping him in Mexico and 
bringing him to the United States to stand trial for the alleged torture and 
murder of a DEA agent in Mexico.56 The district court dismissed the 
claims against the U.S. defendants, leaving only a dispute between al-
iens (Mexican nationals). The Supreme Court held that federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the dispute under the ATS. The Court began 
by holding that “the statute is in terms only jurisdictional.”57 Indeed, the 
Court characterized as “implausible” the plaintiff’s argument that “the 
ATS was intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, but as authority 
for the creation of a new cause of action for torts in violation of interna-
tional law.”58 The Court emphasized that the text of the statute, its 
placement in the Judiciary Act, and “the distinction between jurisdiction 
and cause of action” known to the Founders59 all supported the conclu-
sion that “the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of 
action.”60 
Nonetheless, the Sosa Court indicated that federal courts could hear a 
limited number of claims under the ATS. According to the Court, “Sosa 
[the defendant] would have it that the ATS was stillborn because there 
 
54 Id. at 813–14. Judge Bork acknowledged that his thoughts as to the original meaning of 
the ATS were “speculative,” but offered them “merely to show that the statute could have 
served a useful purpose even if the larger tasks assigned it by Filartiga . . . are rejected.” Id. 
at 815. 
55 542 U.S. 692, 692 (2004). 
56 Id. at 698. 
57 Id. at 712. 
58 Id. at 713. 
59 Id. at 712–13. 
60 Id. at 724. 
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could be no claim for relief without a further statute expressly authoriz-
ing adoption of causes of action.”61 The Court rejected this position. In-
stead, the Court concluded that the “jurisdictional grant is best read as 
having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would 
provide a cause of action for the modest number of international law 
violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.”62 Echoing 
Judge Bork’s speculation in Tel-Orin, the Court suggested that these 
violations corresponded to the three crimes against the law of nations 
discussed in Blackstone’s Commentaries: infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, violation of safe conducts, and piracy.63 From this prem-
ise, the Court concluded that the ATS gives federal courts jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a limited number of claims “based on the present-day law of 
nations” so long as they “rest on a norm of international character ac-
cepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable 
to the features of the eighteenth-century paradigms we have recog-
nized.”64  
Of most relevance for present purposes is that the Sosa Court con-
cluded  that the First Congress (1) did not provide a cause of action in 
ATS cases and (2) would have expected federal courts to rely on unwrit-
ten law to provide one. In particular, the Court assumed that Congress 
understood early federal courts to have inherent power to draw on gen-
eral common law—“the ambient law of the era”—to supply causes of 
 
61 Id. at 714. 
62 Id. at 724; see also id. at 719 (stating that “there is every reason to suppose that the First 
Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for 
use by a future Congress or state legislature that might, someday, authorize the creation of 
causes of action”). 
63 Id. at 724. 
64 Id. at 725. Scholars have extensively considered the meaning and import of the Court’s 
decision in Sosa. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, 
Customary International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 
893–901 (2007) (observing that the scope of causes of action within ATS jurisdiction after 
Sosa remains ambiguous); Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain: 
What Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 Notre Dame L. Rev. 
111, 155–56 (2004) (arguing that modern customary international law is inconsistent with 
historical antecedents and thus does not satisfy what Sosa requires for a cause of action to 
fall within ATS jurisdiction); Ralph G. Steinhardt, Laying One Bankrupt Critique to Rest: 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and the Future of International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. 
Courts, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 2241, 2255 (2004) (arguing that Sosa recognized the continued ap-
plicability of international law norms to federal law after Erie); Beth Stephens, Sosa v. Alva-
rez-Machain: “The Door Is Still Ajar” for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70 
Brook. L. Rev. 533, 535 (2004) (heralding Sosa as a “clear victory” for many human rights 
activists).  
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action in cases within the federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction, in-
cluding ATS cases.65 “[I]n the late 18th century,” the Court explained, 
“positive law was frequently relied upon to reinforce and give standard 
expression to the ‘brooding omnipresence’ of the common law then 
thought discoverable by reason.”66 Although the Sosa Court acknowl-
edged that ambient common law no longer supplies causes of action in 
federal court, it suggested that federal courts today may “recognize pri-
vate claims [for the international law violations that the ATS covers] 
under federal common law.”67 The Court stressed, however, several rea-
sons why federal courts should use this federal common law power spar-
ingly, and it refused to recognize a cause of action for the international 
law violation that the plaintiff alleged.68 Ultimately, the Court concluded 
that the lower court erred in permitting the plaintiff to pursue his claims 
for kidnapping and arbitrary detention under the ATS because these 
claims were not sufficiently analogous to the Blackstone crimes to war-
rant adjudication under the statute. 
The Supreme Court construed the ATS a second time in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., and simply repeated Sosa’s account of the 
source of the cause of action in ATS cases.69 The plaintiffs in Kiobel, a 
group of Nigerian nationals (living in the United States as legal resi-
dents), filed an ATS suit in federal court against certain Dutch, British, 
and Nigerian corporations, alleging that they aided and abetted the Nige-
rian government in committing various international human rights viola-
tions in Nigeria, including extrajudicial killings, crimes against humani-
ty, and torture.70 The Second Circuit held that the ATS does not give 
federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over claims against corpora-
tions,71 and the Supreme Court initially granted certiorari to review that 
determination. After argument, however, the Court ordered the parties to 
brief and argue an additional question: “Whether and under what cir-
cumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action for 
 
65 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. 
66 Id. at 722 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing)). 
67 Id. at 732.  
68 Id. at 725–28. 
69 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013). 
70 Id. at 1662–63. 
71 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). 
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violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a sover-
eign other than the United States.”72  
Following re-argument, the Supreme Court applied the presumption 
against extraterritorial application of U.S. law to affirm the dismissal of 
the case. The Court acknowledged that the presumption ordinarily is 
used to determine the extraterritorial application of substantive statutes 
that regulate conduct, and it reaffirmed Sosa’s conclusion that the ATS 
is “strictly jurisdictional”73 and thus “does not directly regulate conduct 
or afford relief.”74 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that “the principles 
underlying the canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts consid-
ering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS.”75  
In reaching this conclusion, the Kiobel Court reiterated Sosa’s as-
sumptions regarding the source of the cause of action in ATS cases. 
Quoting Sosa, the Court explained that the ATS’s “grant of jurisdiction 
is . . . ‘best read as having been enacted on the understanding that the 
common law would provide a cause of action for [a] modest number of 
international law violations.’”76 The Kiobel Court explained that in Sosa 
“[w]e thus held that federal courts may ‘recognize private claims [for 
such violations] under federal common law.’”77 Given the policies un-
derlying the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 
the Court concluded that the presumption applies to the federal common 
law causes of action that courts may recognize in ATS cases. 
Many scholars have endorsed the Supreme Court’s view that the First 
Congress would have expected federal courts to derive the cause of ac-
tion in ATS cases from ambient common law. Some scholars have spe-
cifically claimed that in 1789 courts would have applied preexisting 
common law causes of action in exercising their jurisdiction under the 
ATS.78 Other scholars have claimed that in 1789 federal courts pos-
 
72 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 1738, 1738 (2012) (mem.) (citation 
omitted). 
73 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
74 Id. 
75 Id. According to the Court, to rebut the presumption, the ATS would have to evince a 
clear indication of extraterritoriality, and the Court found no such indication. Id. at 1663–69.  
76 Id. at 1663 (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724).  
77 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).  
78 See, e.g., William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of the Alien Tort Statute: A Re-
sponse to the “Originalists”, 19 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 221, 239 (1996) (“[T]he 
First Congress understood that torts in violation of the law of nations would be cognizable at 
common law, just as any other tort would be.”); David H. Moore, An Emerging Uniformity 
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sessed and would have exercised judicial power to create general com-
mon law causes of action.79 In recent years, numerous scholars have em-
braced and recited the Sosa Court’s suggestion that general common law 
originally supplied the cause of action in ATS cases80 and beyond.81 
As the remainder of this Article will explain, however, these judicial 
and scholarly accounts contradict the actual historical source of the 
causes of action that early federal courts adjudicated. Federal courts did 
not derive the cause of action in cases within their subject matter juris-
diction from general principles of the common law. Rather, federal 
 
for International Law, 75 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 35 (2006) (“The First Congress’s intent that 
federal courts recognize a limited number of common-law causes of action based on the law 
of nations was easy to achieve at the time the ATS was enacted, as federal courts could legit-
imately apply [customary international law] as general federal common law.”).  
79 See, e.g., Brad R. Roth, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain; United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 98 
Am. J. Int’l L. 798, 800 (2004) (observing that before 1938 federal courts had “authority to 
establish substantive causes of action under ‘general common law’” (quoting Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)); Beth Stephens, Sosa, the Federal Common Law 
and Customary International Law: Reaffirming the Federal Courts’ Powers, Proceedings of 
the Annual Meeting, 101 Am. Soc’y of Int’l L. 269, 269–70 (2007) (arguing that “[s]ince the 
framing of the Constitution, the federal courts have had the power to apply customary inter-
national law as a rule of decision and to recognize a common-law cause of action for viola-
tions of international law . . . as a fundamental judicial power, not dependent on the authori-
zation of the other branches of government”).  
80 Such articles address both the ATS and other questions about federal court jurisdiction. 
See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Commentary on Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum: The Kiobel 
Presumption and Extraterritoriality, 52 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 8, 12 (2013) (“Sosa held that 
the ATS was a jurisdictional statute, enacted with the expectation that the common law 
would provide a cause of action through judicial law development.”); William S. Dodge, Al-
ien Tort Litigation: The Road Not Taken, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1577, 1578 (2014) (de-
scribing Sosa as “clarifying that the cause of action came not from the ATS itself but from 
federal common law”); Chimène I. Keitner, State Courts and Transitory Torts in Transna-
tional Human Rights Cases, 3 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 81, 88 (2013) (citing Sosa for the claim 
that “[t]he cause of action came from the common law of the time, which included custom-
ary international law” (internal citation marks omitted)); Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdic-
tion and Merits, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 643, 677 (2005) (“[T]he [Sosa] Court stated that federal 
Common Law in existence in 1789, incorporating principles of international law and the law 
of nations, provided the applicable substantive law for the actions that federal courts had 
been empowered to adjudicate.”). 
81 See Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the Executive in Bivens Ac-
tions: What Is Special About Special Factors?, 45 Ind. L. Rev. 719, 726 (2012) (“At the time 
the U.S. Constitution was written, a common law cause of action was simply presumed to 
exist, and for at least a century after the Constitution was framed, individuals could sue pub-
lic officials who had violated their constitutional rights for damages.”); Carlos M. Vázquez 
& Stephen I. Vladeck, State Law, the Westfall Act, and the Nature of the Bivens Question, 
161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 509, 539 (2013) (arguing that because “the common law was regarded as 
part of the ‘general’ law” during the pre-Erie era, federal courts “interpreted and applied the 
common law according to their own best judgment” (internal citation omitted)).  
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courts borrowed state causes of action in suits at common law (such as 
ATS suits) because the First Congress enacted statutes instructing them 
to do so. Because the Supreme Court’s stated goal in ATS cases has 
been to identify and implement the expectations of the First Congress,82 
the Court should reconsider its approach to the ATS in light of this his-
tory. 
II. THE PROCESS ACTS AND THE CAUSE OF ACTION 
As discussed, in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court sur-
mised that the First Congress expected federal courts exercising jurisdic-
tion under the ATS to find the applicable causes of action in the “ambi-
ent” common law of the era.83 Members of the First Congress, however, 
did not rely on notions of ambient law to supply the causes of action 
available in the newly-created federal court system. Rather, they specifi-
cally provided the applicable causes of action by statute. The next two 
Parts will explain this legislation—and federal judicial practice pursuant 
to it—and the last Part will reexamine Sosa in light of this history. 
When the First Congress considered how to set up the federal judici-
ary, a struggle occurred between those who favored a centralized nation-
al judiciary with its own distinctive procedures and those who wanted to 
tie federal judicial procedures to local state law and practice. Those who 
opposed a centralized federal judiciary prevailed in many respects, in-
cluding with respect to the causes of action that would be available to 
federal courts in common law cases. Rather than leave federal courts 
free to find or create causes of action on the basis of their own concep-
tions of the common law, the First Congress enacted specific statutes—
most importantly, the Process Acts of 178984 and 179285—that specified 
the causes of action to be used in federal courts. It is easy today to over-
look the role that these provisions played in the work of early federal 
courts because today’s legal regime is so different. Congress wrote these 
early statutes in eighteenth-century legalese, little contemporaneous ex-
 
82 See, e.g., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (stating that “federal courts should not recognize private 
claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less def-
inite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar 
when [the ATS] was enacted”).  
83 Id. at 714. See also id. at 726 (describing “‘general’ common law” as the source of caus-
es of action in early federal courts (internal citation omitted)). 
84 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93 (repealed 1792). 
85 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, 1 Stat. 275 (repealed 1872). 
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position of their meaning survives, and they no longer govern how fed-
eral courts operate. But read in light of background understandings of a 
“cause of action” in 1789, these statutes prescribed the causes of action 
that early federal courts were authorized to adjudicate. The background 
understandings that illuminate the meaning of these provisions may be 
largely unfamiliar to modern readers. These understandings were ele-
mentary, however, to eighteenth-century lawyers. Read in context, the 
Process Acts directed federal courts to apply state law causes of action 
in common law cases, and traditional equitable remedies in cases in eq-
uity. 
This Part will explain, first, the concept of the cause of action that 
prevailed in 1789 when the First Congress took up the question of what 
causes of action federal courts should apply. It then explains how mem-
bers of the First Congress sought to ensure the application of local state 
law in federal courts, including state common law causes of action, and 
why Congress did not leave federal courts free to discern the existence 
of causes of action from abstract conceptions of the common law. Final-
ly, this Part will describe the statutes that Congress enacted to regulate 
the causes of action available in federal court, and how these statutes 
precluded federal courts from defining causes of action in accordance 
with general common law principles. Early federal statutes defined the 
causes of action available in federal court, most importantly by adopting 
state law causes of action for use in common law cases. 
A. Causes of Action in the Late Eighteenth Century 
To understand how early acts of Congress defined the causes of ac-
tion available in federal court, one must appreciate two important facets 
of judicial practice in England and America in 1789. First, local law, not 
general law, determined the existence of a cause of action in English and 
American courts. In other words, each sovereign determined for itself—
as a matter of local law—the kind of injuries for which its courts would 
provide remedies. There was no transnational, general law system that 
defined causes of action or their availability. Second, local forms of pro-
ceeding supplied the causes of action available to litigants. In other 
words, a plaintiff had a cause of action if the local law of the sovereign 
provided a form of proceeding that supplied a remedy for the kind of in-
jury the plaintiff had suffered. This background provides essential con-
text for understanding the early acts of Congress that established the 
causes of action available in federal courts. In the Process Acts of 1789 
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and 1792, Congress required federal courts to apply state forms of pro-
ceeding in actions at law, and thus to employ state law causes of action 
for common law cases within their jurisdiction. 
1. A Matter of Local Law, Not General Law 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Sosa stated that the First Congress 
would have expected federal courts to look to the “common law” for 
causes of action in ATS cases.86 It is not entirely clear what the Court 
meant in this regard. There are several indications, however, that the 
Court equated “the common law” with the kind of “general law” that the 
Supreme Court applied as a rule of decision in Swift v. Tyson.87 For ex-
ample, quoting Justice Holmes, the Court stated that “[w]hen [the ATS] 
was enacted, the accepted conception was of the common law as ‘a tran-
scendental body of law outside of any particular State but obligatory 
within it unless and until changed by statute.’”88 This description is a di-
rect reference to the kind of general law that the Court applied under the 
Swift doctrine and later rejected in Erie. Similarly, the Court referred to 
the common law at the time of the ATS’s enactment as “the ambient law 
of the era,”89 suggesting that it was part of a general law that sovereigns 
shared in common, as opposed to the local law of a particular sover-
eign.90 
The Sosa Court’s suggestion that ambient or general common law 
would have supplied the cause of action in early ATS cases is at odds 
with historical practice because general law did not supply causes of ac-
tion in English and early American courts. Rather, local law supplied the 
cause of action at that time. To understand the Sosa Court’s error, one 
 
86 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724, 729. 
87 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). 
88 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725 (quoting Black and White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown and 
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
89 Id. at 714. 
90 A fair reading of Sosa suggests that when the Court referred to “the common law” and 
“the ambient law of the era,” it was referring to the kind of general common law applied by 
federal courts during the Swift era. Of course, the federal courts’ application of general law 
pre-dated Swift and expanded after that decision. See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. 
Clark, General Law in Federal Court, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 655, 677–87 (2013) [herein-
after Bellia & Clark, General Law in Federal Court] (describing the federal courts’ early ap-
plication of general law). Even if one thinks that the Sosa Court’s use of the phrases “the 
common law” and “the ambient law of the era” refers to something other than general law, 
our point is simply that these phrases do not appear to refer to state common law forms of 
action under the Process Acts. 
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must appreciate the distinction between general law and local law that 
prevailed when Congress enacted the ATS. Although English courts rou-
tinely applied unwritten law to cases before them, they did not treat all 
forms of unwritten law as one undifferentiated mass. Rather, the laws of 
England drew a significant distinction between local law and general 
law. 
Local law was law that governed only within the jurisdiction or bor-
ders of a particular sovereign.91 In other words, local law was law local 
to a sovereign state or nation (not necessarily, as we use the phrase to-
day, local to a subunit of government, such as a county or town). “Mat-
ters subject to local law were typically those that occurred within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the state and affected only that state, such as trusts 
and estates, property, local contracts, civil injuries, and crime.”92 Local 
law could be written (an act of the legislature) or unwritten (a matter of 
common law).93 By contrast, general law referred to law applicable not 
just in one sovereign, but in all civilized nations, based on custom and 
the law of reason.94 “Matters governed by general law originally were 
those of interest to more than one state, such as commercial transactions 
between citizens of different states, maritime matters, and the relations 
between sovereign states.”95 The law merchant, the law maritime, and 
the law of state-state relations—all branches of general law—governed 
such matters, respectively.96 Like local law, general law could be incor-
porated into written law (a legislative act) or unwritten law (the common 
law). 
Local law, not general law, defined the causes of action that a litigant 
could pursue in English and American state courts after the War of In-
dependence. Blackstone began his chapter on “the cognizance of private 
wrongs” in English courts by explaining that local English law defined 
the causes of action that any court of England could hear.97 “Every na-
tion must and will abide by its own municipal laws” regarding the juris-
diction of its courts and what causes of action will be permitted, “which 
 
91 Id. at 665–67 (defining local law and distinguishing it from general law). 
92 Id. at 666. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. Blackstone equated the idea of “general law” with the “law of nations,” describing 
general law to include the law of state-state relations, the law merchant, and the law mari-
time. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *66. 
95 Bellia & Clark, General Law in Federal Court, supra note 90, at 666.  
96 Id. 
97 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *86–87. 
BELLIA&CLARK_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2015  3:49 PM 
2015] The Original Source of the Cause of Action 631 
various accidents conspire to render different in almost every country in 
Europe.”98 To be sure, once local law provided a cause of action, general 
law might supply a rule of decision for resolving the case. But English 
courts did not look to general law to define the causes of action they 
could hear; rather, they looked exclusively to the local law of England, 
written or unwritten. 
Thus, if the Sosa Court, in saying that early federal courts found caus-
es of action in “ambient law” or “common law,” meant that early federal 
courts found causes of action in general law, then the Court was simply 
mistaken. In 1789, lawyers and judges understood local law, not general 
common law, to define the causes of action available in English and 
American state courts. If, instead, the Sosa Court meant that early feder-
al courts would find causes of action by reference to some source of lo-
cal common law—such as the local common law of England—the Court 
also was mistaken. By statute, Congress required federal courts to bor-
row common law causes of action from local state law. We will return to 
this point after explaining, in the next Section, how late eighteenth-
century lawyers understood the concept of the cause of action. 
2. The Cause of Action in English Law 
In the late eighteenth century, lawyers and judges trained in the Eng-
lish common law tradition understood the availability of a cause of ac-
tion to be determined by whether local law provided a form of proceed-
ing capable of redressing the harm in question. This understanding is 
fundamentally different from the way in which lawyers and judges un-
derstand the concept of a cause of action today. Today, we consider the 
cause of action to be governed by substantive law. We typically ask 
whether a person who has suffered an injury is legally entitled to request 
a judicial remedy for that injury. If so, that person has a cause of ac-
tion.99 At the Founding, the question proceeded differently because 
forms and modes of proceeding defined the existence of a cause of ac-
tion. At law, there were predetermined forms of action that authorized 
certain remedies. An injured plaintiff could seek a judicial remedy only 
if he could fit his case into an established form of action by pleading suf-
ficient facts to demonstrate that he was entitled to the writ in question. 
 
98 Id. at *87.  
99 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 777, 
792–99 (2004) (explaining the development of modern understandings of causes of action). 
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As William Blackstone explained, the specific remedy that a particular 
writ provided was the “foundation of the suit.”100 “When a person has 
received an injury, and thinks it worth his while to demand a satisfaction 
for it, he is to consider . . . what redress the law has given for that injury; 
and thereupon is to make application or suit . . . for that particular spe-
cific remedy . . . .”101 A cause of action existed at law, then, when a form 
of action provided a remedy for the kind of injury that the plaintiff had 
suffered.102 
For these reasons, the cause of action was inextricably bound up with 
the available forms of proceeding. One had a cause of action if and only 
if one satisfied the legal determinants necessary to obtain a remedy af-
forded by a particular form of proceeding.103 As F.W. Maitland ex-
plained, in the late eighteenth century, “the forms of action are given,” 
and “the causes of action must be deduced therefrom.”104 Henry John 
Stephen likewise explained in his influential 1824 treatise on pleading 
that “the enumeration of writs, and that of actions” is “identical.”105 As 
this system worked in the eighteenth century, the availability of the rem-
edy determined the existence of a cause of action, rather than the exist-
ence of a cause of action determining the availability of a remedy. 
 
100 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *272. 
101 Id. at *272–73. 
102 See Bellia, supra note 99, at 784–89 (describing the concept of a legal cause of action 
that prevailed at the time of the Founding); see also G. Edward White, Tort Law in America: 
An Intellectual History 9–10 (2d ed. 2003) (describing how common law writs determined, 
for example, the substance of tort law). The growth and decline of the writ system is de-
scribed in John H. Langbein, Renee Lettow Lerner & Bruce P. Smith, History of the Com-
mon Law: The Development of Anglo-American Legal Institutions 87–100, 377–402 (2009). 
103 See Bellia, supra note 99, at 783. 
104 F.W. Maitland, The Forms of Action at Common Law: A Course of Lectures 6 (A.H. 
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker eds., 1936). As Maitland further explained it, an aggrieved person 
might “find that, plausible as his case may seem, it just will not fit any one of the receptacles 
provided by the courts and he may take to himself the lesson that where there is no remedy 
there is no wrong.” Id. at 4–5.  
105 Henry John Stephen, A Treatise on the Principles of Pleading in Civil Actions 8 (Phila-
delphia, Abraham Small 1824) (footnotes omitted). As Stephen explained more extensively,  
An original writ . . . is essential to the due institution of the suit. These instruments 
have consequently had the effect of limiting and defining the right of action itself; and 
no cases are considered as within the scope of judicial remedy, in the English law, but 
those to which the language of some known writ is found to apply, or for which some 
new writ, framed on the analogy of those already existing, may, under the provision of 
the Statute of Westminster 2, be lawfully devised. The enumeration of writs, and that 
of actions, have become, in this manner, identical. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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The prerogative courts of equity and admiralty had a similar concep-
tion of the cause of action. Although equity began as a flexible alterna-
tive to law for aggrieved persons to draw upon the reserve justice of the 
Crown,106 by the late eighteenth century equity and law had become 
“equally artificial,” differing only in their forms and modes of proceed-
ing.107 In equity and admiralty, a plaintiff commenced a suit by filing a 
bill or a libel, respectively, specifying the right or title upon which the 
court could grant a particular remedy. If such pleadings failed to specify 
these matters, then the plaintiff had no cause of action and would not 
prevail. In this regard, courts of equity at the time had “no more discre-
tionary power than Courts of Law.”108 
To understand how the First Congress defined the causes of action 
available in federal courts, it is important to appreciate the terminology 
that defined causes of action in this system. In cases at law, a plaintiff 
generally would commence an action by seeking an appropriate “writ.” 
In common law courts, “there were a certain number of writs which dif-
fered very markedly from each other.”109 Each writ corresponded to a 
particular “form of action.”110 Blackstone explained that a plaintiff 
would request a specific “original writ” in order to pursue a “specific 
remedy” in the form of action that the writ designated.111 Examples of 
original common law writs—designating particular forms of action—
included ejectment (to recover possession of real property), detinue (to 
recover possession of personal property based upon a superior right), re-
plevin (to recover possession of personal property wrongfully taken), 
debt (to recover money due), covenant (to recover for breach of a prom-
ise under seal), special assumpsit (to recover damages for breach of con-
 
106 See Bellia, supra note 99, at 789. 
107 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *434. For a discussion of how intensive doctrinalization 
limited the discretion of courts of equity, beginning in the late seventeenth century and con-
tinuing through the early nineteenth century, see Langbein, Lerner & Smith, supra note 102, 
at 351–54. 
108 1 Henry Maddock, A Treatise on the Principles and Practice of the High Court of 
Chancery, at viii (2d Am. ed. Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke & Sons 1822). 
109 Maitland, supra note 104, at 5. 
110 Id. 
111 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *272. As examples, he explained, 
As, for money due on a bond, an action of debt; for goods detained without a force, an 
action of detinue or trover; or, if taken with force, and action of trespass vi et armis; 
or, to try the title of lands, a writ of entry or action of trespass in ejectment; or, for any 
consequential injury received, a special action on the case. 
Id. at *273 (emphasis in original). 
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tract), general (indebitatus) assumpsit (to recover damages in quasi con-
tract), trespass (to recover damages for physical interference with person 
or property), trespass on the case (to recover damages for wrongful acts 
resulting in indirect interference with person or property), and trover (to 
recover damages for the conversion of chattel).112 Judges and writers on 
the common law used the phrases “form of action” and “form of pro-
ceeding” synonymously to denote the kind of action that a particular 
writ authorized a plaintiff to pursue.113 (They also used the phrase “form 
of proceeding” more broadly to denote the remedies that a plaintiff 
could pursue in equity as well.) If a plaintiff could fit his injury into a 
particular form of proceeding designated by a writ, the plaintiff was said 
to have a “cause” or a “cause of action.” 
Each form of proceeding was its own miniature legal system. As 
Maitland explained, each “procedural pigeon-hole” designated by an 
original writ “contain[ed] its own rules of substantive law.”114 Moreover, 
each form of proceeding required its own “method of pursuing and ob-
taining” a remedy in court.115 In other words, “each cause of action” de-
fined by a writ “had its own mini-civil procedure system” regarding 
matters such as summons, proof, and remedies.116 Lawyers and judges 
sometimes used the phrase “mode of proceeding” to describe the par-
ticular method of obtaining redress under a given form of proceeding,117 
 
112 Roscoe Pound, Readings on the History and System of the Common Law 349–50 
(1913). 
113 See, e.g., 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *271 (explaining, with respect to the writ sys-
tem, that the “forms of proceeding are in all material respects the same” in the common law 
courts of Westminster). As an example of how these terms were used by courts, in Jefferson 
v. Bishop of Durham, (1797) 126 Eng. Rep. 804 (C.P.) 812–13; 1 Bos. & Pul. 105, 120–21, a 
question before the court was “[w]hether a writ of prohibition lies in the Court of Common 
Pleas to restrain a bishop from committing waste in the possession of his see.” Id. at 812–13. 
To determine whether the writ would lie, Chief Justice Eyre examined “the forms of pro-
ceeding contained in books of very high authority.” Id. at 813. For an example from a re-
ported case in America, see Black v. Digges’s Executors, 1 H. & McH. 153, 155 (Md. 1744) 
(explaining that a writ of “indebitatus assumpsit will not lie but where debt will lie” and 
“[t]hat neither indebitatus assumpsit nor debt will lie upon any collateral undertaking, 
though assumpsit will, and the difference between the actions arises from the different form 
of proceeding”).  
114 Maitland, supra note 104, at 4. 
115 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *115. 
116 Langbein, Lerner & Smith, supra note 102, at 96. 
117 See, e.g., The King v. Almon, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 94 (K.B.) 101; Wilm. 243, 259 
(considering attachment and trial by jury as different “modes of proceeding”). 
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and sometimes they used “mode of proceeding” as a synonym for “form 
of proceeding.”118 
Some forms of proceeding offered remedies for common legal inju-
ries. Writs of trespass, for example, offered remedies for many common 
legal harms. Blackstone described the kinds of familiar injuries for 
which writs of trespass provided remedies: 
[B]eating another is a trespass; for which . . . an action of trespass vi et 
armis in assault and battery will lie: taking or detaining a man’s goods 
are respectively trespasses; for which an action of trespass vi et armis, 
or on the case in trover and conversion, is given by the law: so also non-
performance of promises or undertakings is a trespass, upon which an 
action of trespass on the case in assumpsit is grounded.119 
Other forms of proceeding were less common. For example, “the old 
writ of admeasurement of pasture” provided a specific remedy for a nar-
rowly defined legal injury.120 “By that mode of proceeding,” as Justice 
Buller explained in 1790, “if the defendant put more cattle on the com-
mon than he ought, the plaintiff was entitled to have a certain quantity 
admeasured to the defendant; the excess then is the injury in these cas-
es.”121 However broadly or narrowly applicable, a writ that fit the plain-
tiff’s alleged injury was necessary to commence an action at law. With-
out an applicable writ—and thus without a form of action/proceeding 
through which to pursue a remedy—a plaintiff had no cause of action. 
In England, both the common law and statutes defined the forms and 
modes of proceeding available in English courts.122 When a statute pro-
vided the form of proceeding, courts in England and America considered 
themselves bound to follow the statutory form.123 English courts also 
 
118 See, e.g., Mason v. Sainsbury, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (K.B.) 539; 3 Dougl. 61, 63 
(argument of counsel) (arguing that “a man who has two remedies may pursue either of 
them, and that it is no defence to say he has another mode of proceeding”).  
119 3 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *208. 
120 Hobson v. Todd, (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 900 (K.B.) 901; 4 T. R. 71, 74.  
121 Id. 
122 1 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *67. 
123 For an example of an English case, see Goodwin v. Parry, (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 1185 
(K.B.) 1186; 4 T. R. 577, 578 (“[T]he words of the Act of Parliament are positive that no 
process shall be sued out until the affidavit has been first duly made and filed: and though in 
ordinary cases a party may wave taking advantage of any trifling irregularity in the mode of 
proceeding by not objecting in the first instance, the defendants in this case could not wave 
this objection, because the Court are to take care that an action on a penal statute shall not be 
commenced in a mode prohibited by that statute.”). 
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considered themselves bound to follow the forms and modes of proceed-
ing provided by the common law of England. In England, common law 
forms and modes of proceeding, like all unwritten English law, depend-
ed “upon immemorial usage” for their support.124 Following their inde-
pendence, American states individually adopted the common law of 
England, subject to their own adaptation of it to local circumstances.125 
In short, neither English courts nor American courts considered them-
selves free to create new forms of proceeding not provided by the stat-
utes or the common law of their respective jurisdictions.126 
Although late eighteenth-century English and American courts could 
not create new forms of proceeding, they did at times apply existing 
forms of proceeding with enough flexibility to meet the demands of jus-
tice. For example, in discussing ejectments, Lord Mansfield wrote that 
“[t]he great advantage of this fictitious mode [of proceeding] is, that be-
ing under the control of the Court, it may be so modelled as to answer in 
the best manner every end of justice and convenience.”127 The line be-
tween courts improperly creating new forms of proceeding and properly 
molding old ones to meet the demands of justice was not perfectly clear, 
but it was a line that English courts and treatise writers attempted to 
maintain.128 
 
124 1 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *68.  
125 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations, 
109 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 29 (2009) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Federal Common Law of Na-
tions] (describing state incorporation and adaptation of the common law). 
126 See, e.g., Case v. Case, 1 Kirby 284, 285 (Conn. 1787) (explaining that a court could 
not employ a mode of proceeding that was not established by law); Paine v. Ely, 1 N. Chip. 
14, 21 (Vt. 1789) (“[T]he mode of proceeding . . . . is pointed out and regulated, not by the 
common law, but solely by statute; and must be strictly pursued—A different mode cannot 
be adopted, under pretence of its being more convenient for the debtor, or for the Justices—
This would be to assume an arbitrary power not warranted by law.”); Miller v. The Lord 
Proprietary, 1 H. & McH. 543, 548 (Md. 1774) (argument of Attorney General) (“[W]here 
statutes point out a particular mode of proceeding, such mode of proceeding must be fol-
lowed.”). 
127 Fowler v. Sham-Title, (1762) 97 Eng. Rep. 837 (K.B.) 840; 3 Burr. 1290, 1295–96. For 
an American state case, see Rossell v. Inslee, 6 N.J.L. 475, 476 (1799) (“It is clear that an 
ejectment is almost entirely a fictitious proceeding, introduced from views of general con-
venience, which courts have assumed the power of moulding, so as to answer the purposes 
of justice, and in order to prevent a fiction from working injustice to any one.”). 
128 As English treatise-writer John Sheridan explained: 
 [The court of King’s Bench], like all the other courts of this country, is bound to 
judge according to the known and fixed laws of the land, that is to say, the common 
law . . . and the written or statute law; nor can the one or the other be altered, but by 
express statute: the rules of practice, or mode of proceeding in each court, are indeed, 
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The forms and modes of proceeding that defined causes of action var-
ied among courts of different jurisdictions. In England, the common law 
courts, equity courts, and admiralty courts all had different forms and 
modes of proceeding.129 In the United States, state forms of proceeding 
differed in important respects from English forms of proceeding and 
from state to state.130 For example, in 1785, the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas observed that Pennsylvania had “a positive act of As-
sembly directing the mode of proceeding, upon mortgages, intirely dif-
ferent from the modes prescribed in England.”131 The court was not re-
ferring here to what today we would consider mere matters of procedure. 
Rather, the court was referring to the remedy provided by a common law 
form of action. Instead of following the English practice, the Pennsylva-
nia statute prescribed a distinct form of action that “confine[d] the reme-
dy of the mortgagee to the recovery of the principal and interest due on 
the mortgage.”132 State forms of action also commonly varied from each 
other. For example, as Maryland Chief Justice Samuel Chase casually 
observed shortly before he joined the Supreme Court of the United 
States, “[t]he mode of proceeding for the recovery of debts, is variant in 
the several States.”133 
 
of course, much under the regulation of the respective courts, yet any material altera-
tions in this respect, or such as may, in any very considerable degree, affect the sub-
ject, are generally, and indeed it is to be wished ever may be, made by act of parlia-
ment. 
John Sheridan, The Present Practice of the Court of King’s Bench 17 (London, W. Flexney 
& J. Walker 1784). 
129 The forms and modes of proceeding had long varied in other courts in England as well, 
such as ecclesiastical courts. See Judgment of 1675, 89 Eng. Rep. 207 (K.B.) 207; 1 Free-
man 286, 286–87 (describing a form of proceeding that obtained in the Ecclesiastical Court 
that did not obtain as an original matter in the King’s Bench).  
130 See 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 472–73 (“There flourished . . . divergencies from Eng-
lish common law procedures and native inventions in every state peculiar to its jurispru-
dence.”).  
131 Dorrow’s Assignee v. Kelly, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 142, 144–45 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1785) (empha-
sis in original).  
132 Id. at 145 (emphasis in original). For another example of a state law that provided a dif-
ferent action for a remedy than English law provided, see Davidson’s Lessee v. Beatty, 3 H. 
& McH. 594, 615 (Md. 1797) (opinion of Chase, J.) (describing how Maryland law provided 
“a special and auxiliary remedy for the recovery of debts in three several cases, and this spe-
cial remedy is by attachment,” and describing the “mode of proceeding” the act prescribed 
for that remedy). 
133 Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 555 (Md. 1797).  
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B. The First Congress and Federal Judicial Power 
To understand the acts of the First Congress establishing and regulat-
ing federal courts, it is important to keep in mind the two key points dis-
cussed in the preceding Section: First, that the local law of a particular 
sovereign (as opposed to general law) determined the causes of action 
that its courts could adjudicate, and, second, that the laws of England 
and American states differed among themselves in various ways in de-
fining the causes of action available in their respective courts. 
When the First Congress met in 1789, a struggle ensued between 
those who favored more consolidated federal judicial power and those 
who favored preservation of the existing power of state judiciaries. This 
struggle was a continuation of debates that occurred both at the Federal 
Convention and during the ratification debates over the scope of federal 
judicial power. Opponents of creating inferior federal courts argued that 
such courts would unduly interfere with state sovereignty134 and poten-
tially obliterate state courts.135 They argued that federal courts would be 
inconvenient fora for litigants, especially defendants haled into distant 
courts.136 Opponents also expressed concerns about the novel procedures 
that federal courts might employ. They were especially concerned that 
federal courts would fail to draw juries from the locality of the incident 
or that they would deny jury trial rights altogether.137 At the time, the 
right to a jury trial and the method of jury selection varied throughout 
the United States, and how federal courts would treat these matters was 
an open question (especially prior to the adoption of the Seventh 
Amendment).138 Opponents of a strong national judiciary were also con-
cerned that federal courts, once created, would exercise unfettered equi-
ty powers.139 
In the First Judiciary Act, Congress reached an initial compromise re-
garding the establishment of inferior federal courts for the United States. 
It created district and circuit courts, but defined and limited their respec-
 
134 See 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–
1800, supra note 21, at 5, 10–11 (discussing the basis of such opposition). 
135 Id. at 12. 
136 See 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 472–73 (discussing such arguments). 
137 See 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–
1800, supra note 21, at 8, 14–15 (discussing such concerns). 
138 See id. at 17 (discussing such variability). 
139 See id. at 12 (discussing such concerns). 
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tive jurisdictions in significant ways.140 In light of long-standing con-
cerns about the scope of federal judicial power, the Act also contained 
important directions regarding the sources of law that federal courts 
were to apply. For example, in Section 34, the Judiciary Act famously 
directed federal courts to apply local state law rules of decision absent 
preemption by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States: 
“[T]he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties 
or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall 
be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of 
the United States in cases where they apply.”141 Although little evidence 
survives regarding the drafting of this text,142 it is believed that “[t]he 
addition of Section 34 was induced . . . by the need for some positive di-
rection regarding the basic law by which the new courts were to be gov-
erned.”143 In addition, Section 16 of the Act prohibited federal courts 
from entertaining suits in equity when an adequate remedy existed at 
law.144 This provision prevented federal courts from extending their eq-
uity jurisdiction beyond its conventional limits, which in turn could have 
deprived litigants of a jury trial. 
Amidst these compromises and limitations, it would have been sur-
prising if members of the First Congress had left federal courts free to 
find or create causes of action on the basis of ambient or general law, as 
the Sosa Court suggested. As explained, if by “ambient law” the Sosa 
Court was referring to general law, then the Court was simply mistaken. 
English and American courts had never understood general law to sup-
ply the causes of action available to litigants. As explained, general law 
covered subjects of mutual interest to multiple nations, such as the law 
of state-state relations, the law merchant, and the law maritime.145 Gen-
eral law did not create causes of action; rather, causes of action were 
matters of local law. 
 
140 The First Judiciary Act defined most of the jurisdiction of federal courts in §§ 9–13. 
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9–13, 1 Stat. 73, 76–81. In §§ 14–17, the Act proceeded to 
confer certain powers on federal courts. Id. §§ 14–17, 1 Stat. at 81–83. 
141 Id. § 34, 1 Stat. at 92. 
142 See 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 502 (“Nothing more is known of its genesis than that 
the text is written out on a chit in Ellsworth’s hand and marked for page 15.”). 
143 Id.  
144 Congress provided in § 16 “[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the 
courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be 
had at law.” Judiciary Act of 1789 § 16, 1 Stat. at 82.  
145 See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text. 
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Even if it had been possible for a court to derive causes of action from 
principles of general law, it is unlikely that the First Congress would 
have left federal courts free to undertake such a novel experiment. The 
Constitution granted federal courts the “judicial Power of the United 
States” but limited their subject matter jurisdiction to particular kinds of 
cases and controversies.146 The Constitution itself did not create federal 
courts with greater remedial powers than English or state courts enjoyed. 
Local law, not general law, had long governed the causes of action 
available in English and American state courts.147 It is thus not surpris-
ing that there is no indication that members of the First Congress enter-
tained the possibility that general law would have supplied causes of ac-
tion in federal court. 
To the contrary, members of Congress appear to have been well 
aware that the local law of the United States would determine the causes 
of action available in federal courts, just as local law had long governed 
the causes of action available in English and state courts. One can readi-
ly see, however, why Congress would not have left federal courts free to 
develop this law on their own. As explained, the local law governing the 
actions available in a particular court system varied from sovereign to 
sovereign, and anti-Federalists in Congress had expressed serious con-
cerns about centralized federal judicial power. Accordingly, Congress 
did not leave federal courts free to develop the local U.S. law governing 
the forms of proceeding they could adjudicate. Rather, Congress took it 
upon itself to provide local U.S. law for this purpose by statute. The 
question before Congress was not whether to leave federal courts free to 
find causes of action on their own. No one suggested this approach. Ra-
ther, the question was whether Congress should try to create uniform 
forms of proceeding for federal courts (as a matter of local federal law), 
or instead tie the forms of proceeding available in federal court to local 
state practice, at least with respect to actions at law. As the next Section 
will explain, the First Congress chose in the end to require federal courts 
to borrow the forms of proceeding governing actions at law in the courts 
of the state where the federal court was located, in order “to quiet the 
alarums raised regarding the threatened inconvenience of the federal 
system.”148 
 
146 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
147 See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
148 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 473. 
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C. The First Judiciary Act and the Process Acts 
Courts and scholars have largely overlooked the role that the First Ju-
diciary Act and the Process Acts played in defining the causes of action 
available in early federal courts. Because none of these statutes used the 
modern phrase “cause of action,” it is easy to assume that these Acts re-
lated only to what we regard today as procedural matters. Read in con-
text, however, the Acts used legal terms of art that were understood at 
the time to provide the causes of action available in federal court. Most 
importantly, in cases at law, Congress required federal courts to adjudi-
cate causes of action recognized under the law of the state in which the 
federal court sat. Although some members of Congress wanted to create 
uniform forms of proceeding for use in all federal courts, Congress re-
jected that approach. Instead, Congress adopted state forms of proceed-
ing for actions at law in federal courts, thus synchronizing the legal 
causes of action available in federal and state courts located in the same 
state. 
As this Section will explain, a late eighteenth-century reader of early 
federal statutes, knowledgeable of background legal principles, would 
have understood Section 14 of the Judiciary Act and the Process Acts of 
1789 and 1792 to specify the causes of action that federal courts were 
authorized to hear. Although their original function has been long over-
looked, these Acts operated to define the causes of action that were 
available to litigants in federal courts for nearly a century. Section 14 of 
the Judiciary Act was enacted on September 24, 1789, and initially pro-
vided federal courts with general authority to adjudicate traditional 
common law causes of action. In parallel legislation enacted five days 
later, Congress provided inferior federal courts with more specific and 
comprehensive instructions in the first Process Act. This Act required 
federal courts to apply state forms of proceeding in actions at law. Con-
gress reenacted this requirement with certain modifications in the Pro-
cess Act of 1792, which continued in force until 1872. 
The Process Act applied when Congress did not otherwise provide a 
specific form of proceeding for the enforcement of a claim within the 
subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts. Congress always 
could—and occasionally did—enact a specific cause of action for the 
enforcement of a specific federal right. For example, in the Patent Act of 
1790, Congress gave patent holders a right against infringement and 
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specified that it was enforceable through an “action on the case.”149 Sim-
ilarly, in the Copyright Act of 1790, Congress gave copyright holders a 
right against republication that was enforceable through an “action of 
debt,” and a right against first publication of a manuscript that was en-
forceable through an “action on the case.”150 Actions of debt and actions 
on the case were common law forms of proceeding at the time. For most 
cases within federal court jurisdiction, however—such as diversity cas-
es—Congress had neither created a federal right nor specified a form of 
proceeding. In such cases, the Process Acts established a background 
rule that directed federal courts to apply the same forms of proceeding in 
actions at law as the local state courts would apply.151 This Section will 
 
149 Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 4, 1 Stat. 109, 111 (repealed 1793). 
150 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, §§ 2, 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125–26 (repealed 1802). 
151 It is important to note at the outset that Congress’s decision to adopt state forms of pro-
ceeding for actions at law, and traditional forms of proceeding in equity and admiralty, did 
not make the cases adjudicated in federal court using those forms of proceeding 
“[c]ases . . . arising under” federal law for purposes of Article III. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 
1. Today, it is generally accepted—as a matter of Article III and statutory “arising under” 
jurisdiction—that one kind of suit arising under federal law is that in which federal law cre-
ates the cause of action. Justice Holmes famously stated this principle in American Well 
Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (“A suit arises under the law 
that creates the cause of action.”). At the time that Congress enacted the First Judiciary Act 
and the Process Acts, however, this formulation did not hold true in all cases. In 1789, a 
right of action was a matter of local procedural law. To have a cause of action, the plaintiff 
would have to employ a form of proceeding that fit the alleged injury to a legal right or title. 
Bellia, supra note 99, at 784–92. A case arose not under the law that created the form of pro-
ceeding, but rather under the law that created the right or title a plaintiff was seeking to en-
force through a form of proceeding. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States—the seminal 
Supreme Court case addressing Article III “arising under” jurisdiction—Chief Justice Mar-
shall explained that the judicial power “is capable of acting only when the subject is submit-
ted to it by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law.” 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
738, 819 (1824) (emphasis added). A case arose under federal law not if federal law provid-
ed the form of action, but rather if “the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by 
one construction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by the oppo-
site construction.” Id. at 822. In other words, a case arose under federal law if a federal ques-
tion formed “an ingredient of the original cause,” but not merely on the ground that federal 
law provided the form of action. Id. at 823. Because at the time “local” federal law defined 
the causes of action available in federal courts—as the local law of any sovereign did—every 
“case” or “controversy” (including, for example, diversity suits) would have arisen under 
federal law under an anachronistic misapplication of the Holmes test. At the Founding, 
whether a case arose under federal law for Article III purposes depended on the source of the 
underlying right or title. Consider, for example, the early federal statute (discussed in the 
text) that gave copyright holders a right enforceable through an action of debt in federal 
court. Cases brought under this statute arose under federal law not because the statute pro-
vided the form of proceeding (an action in debt), but because the federal law created the un-
derlying right to be enforced through that form of proceeding. Conversely, the mere fact that 
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describe the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792 and, to place them in con-
text, will recount the more general directive that Congress first provided 
in Section 14 of the First Judiciary Act. 
1. Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
Section 14 of the Judiciary Act was the first provision Congress en-
acted that pertained to the causes of action available in federal courts. 
The Judiciary Act, of course, created inferior federal courts and defined 
their jurisdiction. It also addressed the original and appellate jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court. It thus was natural for Congress to address in 
some way the causes of action that would be available in federal courts 
in the exercise of their jurisdiction. Section 14 empowered federal courts 
to issue all writs “which may be necessary for the exercise of their re-
spective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages of 
law.”152 Although modern lawyers might not read this provision to con-
cern the power of federal courts to adjudicate causes of action, its 
terms—understood in historical context—encompassed this function. 
In Section 14, Congress provided, specifically, that “courts of the 
United States, shall have power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas 
corpus, and all other writs not specially provided for by statute, which 
may be necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and 
agreeable to the principles and usages of law.”153 Because contempora-
neous statements explaining the meaning of this language do not sur-
vive, background legal context provides the best evidence of its mean-
ing. The first part of this provision referred to the bench writs of scire 
facias and habeas corpus. Bench writs such as these were commands 
that courts issued “to inferior officers and courts.”154 But the second part 
of this provision—authorizing federal courts to issue “all other writs not 
specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exer-
cise of their respective jurisdictions”—was broad enough to encompass 
 
Congress, in the Process Acts, generally authorized federal courts to use state forms of action 
did not mean that every case heard in federal court using those forms of action “arose under” 
federal law. The relevant question was whether federal law provided the underlying right to 
be enforced. Thus, a typical diversity case involving debt or trespass did not arise under fed-
eral law even though the Process Acts required federal courts to borrow the corresponding 
state forms of proceeding in such cases. This is because, in such cases, a federal right or title 
typically did not form an ingredient of the cause of action. 
152 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82. 
153 Id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 81–82. 
154 Langbein, Lerner & Smith, supra note 102, at 95. 
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the original writs through which a plaintiff would pursue a form of ac-
tion. As explained, an original writ designated a form of proceeding 
(such as trespass or debt), through which a plaintiff could pursue a rem-
edy for a particular harm. Thus, on its face, Section 14 authorized feder-
al courts to entertain requests for writs that defined civil causes of ac-
tion.155 In other words, Section 14 authorized federal courts to issue not 
only the bench writs of scire facias and habeas corpus, but also, as Jul-
ius Goebel explained, “the traditional mandates which set in motion civil 
litigation.”156 The original writs at that time encompassed the substantive 
legal requirements that a plaintiff had to allege and ultimately demon-
strate in order to prevail in a lawsuit.157 The language “agreeable to the 
principles and usages of law” codified a traditional limit on common law 
courts—specifically, that courts could not create new forms or modes of 
proceeding.158 Accordingly, in Section 14, Congress authorized federal 
courts to employ only recognized legal causes of action in cases within 
their jurisdiction. 
The writs that initiated common law proceedings defined not only 
remedies and the right to sue, but also some matters that we would de-
scribe today as “procedure.”159 That said, the writs did not encompass all 
 
155 See supra notes 100–18 and accompanying text. 
156 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 509. Courts and scholars have struggled to interpret this 
language, but Professor Goebel’s account seems the most plausible in light of background 
understandings. 
157 See Bellia, supra note 99, at 784–89; see also Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, 
The Suspension Clause: English Text, Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 Va. 
L. Rev. 575, 679 (2008) (explaining that at the time § 14 was enacted, “[English and Ameri-
can jurists] believed that a writ—an individual’s means of access to a court—was also the 
equivalent of a substantive legal doctrine”). 
On March 1, 1824, in Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 3, 7 (1825), Langdon 
Cheves and John Sergeant, counsel for the plaintiffs, argued that in § 14 “[t]he common law 
remedies were . . . adopted” by Congress. The question in the case was whether § 14 author-
ized federal courts to issue post-judgment writs of execution in addition to original writs. 
Chief Justice Marshall determined for the Court that “the general term ‘writs’” included both 
“original process,” or “process anterior to judgment[],” and “process subsequent to the 
judgment.” Id. at 23; see also Bank of the U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 55 
(1825) (stating “[t]hat executions are among the writs hereby authorized to be issued” under 
§ 14 and “cannot admit of doubt”). 
158 See, e.g., Case v. Case, 1 Kirby 284, 285 (Conn. 1787) (explaining that courts cannot 
employ modes of proceeding that are not established by law). As explained infra, some ques-
tion would arise as to whether “agreeable to the principles and usages of law” referred to tra-
ditional common law principles or to state law. See infra notes 184–89 and accompanying 
text. Whatever the answer to this question, § 14 limited the power of federal courts to create 
new writs—and thus new causes of action. 
159 See supra notes 100–18 and accompanying text. 
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matters of judicial practice, such as defaults, costs, contempts, and return 
dates.160 Thus, Section 14 did not purport to provide comprehensive 
rules of practice governing federal courts. Section 17 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 filled this gap by authorizing federal courts to make general 
rules of practice. Specifically, Section 17 provided that “all the said 
courts of the United States shall have power . . . to make and establish 
all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said courts, 
provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United 
States.”161 
There are good reasons to think that members of the First Congress 
did not expect Sections 14 and 17 of the Judiciary Act to establish a 
permanent framework for federal courts. First, the same congressional 
committee that drafted the Judiciary Act simultaneously drafted the Pro-
cess Act of 1789, enacted just five days after the Judiciary Act. Thus, the 
Process Act of 1789 quickly superseded key aspects of Section 14 with 
more specific directives. In addition, as explained, the forms of action 
that original writs designated varied among and between English courts 
and American state courts. Although the language “agreeable to the 
principles and usages of law” constrained federal courts in some meas-
ure, it arguably left them room to choose among varying “principles and 
usages of law” in deciding what writs they would employ. Anti-
Federalists had expressed strong distrust of federal judicial power, and 
they were familiar with how courts could use forms and modes of pro-
ceeding to thwart or promote certain interests.162 Had Congress not en-
acted the more specific directives of the Process Act, the broad language 
of Section 14 could have empowered federal courts to adopt forms of 
proceeding that would have advanced the interests of consolidated fed-
eral governance against state interests. Section 14 also might have al-
lowed federal courts to expand the scope of their equity jurisdiction. 
Although Section 16 of the Judiciary Act prohibited federal courts from 
exercising equity powers when a remedy existed at law,163 Section 14 
left federal courts with room to limit the availability of common law 
writs and thereby expand the realm of their equity powers. Anti-
 
160 For an example of a state law addressing such matters, see An Act Prescribing Forms of Writs 
in Civil Cases, and Directing the Mode of Proceeding Therein, ch. 59,  1784 Mass. Acts 158.  
161 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83. 
162 See supra notes 134–39 and accompanying text. 
163 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 16, 1 Stat. at 82. 
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Federalist members of Congress had a strong distrust of equity and be-
lieved its expansion would dilute jury trial rights.164 
Perhaps for these reasons, the First Congress did not leave the general 
terms of Sections 14 and 17 to govern the causes of action available in 
inferior federal courts.165 As Professor Goebel pointed out, the Senate 
committee that drafted the First Judiciary Act likely never had any “in-
tention of leaving matters on such a vague footing.”166 In a letter dated 
June 16, 1789, Delaware Senator George Read wrote to John Dickin-
son—his friend and former fellow delegate to the Federal Convention—
that “[t]he same committee who reported this bill are preparing another, 
for prescribing and regulating the process of those respective courts.”167 
In other words, members of the First Congress simultaneously drafted 
the Judiciary Act and the Process Act and enacted them within days of 
one another—the Judiciary Act on September 24, 1789, and the Process 
Act five days later. 
2. The Process Acts of 1789 and 1792 
On September 29, 1789, the President signed into law a statute enti-
tled, an “Act to regulate Processes in the Courts of the United States.”168 
This Act came to be known as the Process Act of 1789. The Process Act 
of 1789 provided more specific direction than the Judiciary Act about 
the forms of action and modes of proceeding that federal courts were to 
follow. Three years later, Congress enacted the Process Act of 1792. 
This statute reenacted key provisions of the first Process Act with some 
revisions. 
According to Professor Goebel, the Process Acts were “doomed to be 
little regarded by historians, for the subject matter was hardly such to 
captivate those to whom the larger aspects of institutional development 
were to be more beguiling.”169 The Process Acts, however, hold large 
and underappreciated significance for the institutional development of 
federal courts in the United States. Rather than concerning mere proce-
 
164 See supra notes 137–39 and accompanying text. 
165 See 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 510, 537. 
166 Id. at 510. 
167 Id. (quoting William Thompson Read, Life and Correspondence of George Read, A 
Signer of the Declaration of Independence 480–81 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 
1870)). 
168 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 93 (repealed 1792). 
169 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 509. 
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dure, the Process Acts actually defined the causes of action that were 
available in federal court. The Acts adopted state forms of action as 
causes of action at law in federal courts, and traditional remedies in eq-
uity and admiralty as causes of action for cases within those respective 
jurisdictions. In important ways, the Process Acts were a victory for an-
ti-Federalists against proponents of centralized federal judicial power.170 
The Acts denied federal courts the power to devise a uniform system of 
federal causes of action that potentially could have undermined state in-
terests. The Acts also prevented the development of two fundamentally 
different remedial systems in the same state, thereby sparing litigants 
and lawyers the need to learn a new system. 
a. The Process Act of 1789 
In setting up the federal judiciary, the First Congress faced an im-
portant choice regarding whether to establish uniform forms of proceed-
ing throughout the federal court system. The Senate committee that 
framed the Judiciary Act of 1789 initially drafted a separate bill that at-
tempted to establish some uniform rules of proceeding for federal courts. 
The draft bill addressed the form of writs and processes issuing from 
federal courts, how process would commence in civil actions, rules of 
service, notice of pleas, bail, default, and execution on judgments.171 
Due at least in part to anti-Federalist opposition to “consolidated gov-
ernment,”172 however, Congress was unable to agree on a uniform set of 
procedures for federal courts,173 and the bill was never enacted. Instead, 
Congress enacted the Process Act, which adopted state legal forms of 
action and civil equitable remedies as the actions to be used in federal 
court. 
 
170 See id. at 510 (“Considered in its historical setting the controversy may be viewed as an 
aspect of the sustained offensive conducted by the antifederalists against a ‘consolidated 
government.’” (internal citation omitted)); 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court 
of the United States, 1789–1800, supra note 21, at 108 (discussing how advocates of state 
interests carried the day in the Process Acts).  
171 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, 
supra note 21, at 115–18. For detailed descriptions of this bill, see 1 Goebel, supra note 22, 
at 514–35; 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–
1800, supra note 21, at 108–10. 
172 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 510. 
173 See 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–
1800, supra note 21, at 112. 
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As Maeva Marcus has explained, “[T]he entire Process Act of 1789 
reflected Congress’s inability or unwillingness to agree on uniform rules 
for the operation of the federal courts.”174 The Process Act of 1789 pro-
vided, first, that 
the forms of writs and executions, except their style, and modes of 
process and rates of fees, except fees to judges, in the circuit and dis-
trict courts, in suits at common law, shall be the same in each state re-
spectively as are now used or allowed in the supreme courts of the 
same.175 
In other words, the Act provided that, in actions at law, a federal circuit 
or district court was to apply the forms of writs and executions that pre-
vailed in the supreme court of the state in which it sat.176 
Understood in historical context, this provision served to define the 
causes of action that federal courts could enforce in actions at law by 
reference to state law. The form of the writ employed defined a cause of 
action, as explained in Section II.A.177 For example, under the Process 
Act, if a plaintiff wished to recover damages in federal court for bodily 
injury intentionally inflicted, the plaintiff would seek a writ of trespass, 
so long as state law allowed such a writ, in the form that state law pro-
vided. If a plaintiff sought a writ not recognized under state law, the 
plaintiff’s suit would fail because the district and circuit courts could 
apply only the same writs that the supreme court of the state in which 
they sat used or allowed. Rather than adopt a uniform system of writs 
 
174 Id.; see also 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 510 (“The surviving materials relating to the 
history of this act, the revision of 1792 and the supplementary statute of 1793, are not rich, 
consisting as they do of committee bills, journal entries and exiguous reports of debates, yet 
it is manifest from these sources that a struggle took place between the legislators who fa-
vored creation of a uniform procedure for the new federal courts and those who conceived 
that in each district state forms and modes of process should prevail.”); id. at 539–40 (“If 
there was truth in the antifederalists’ charge that the most ardent federalists were aiming at a 
‘consolidated’ government, the Act for Regulating Processes in its final form was a defeat 
for such ambitions.”). 
175 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1792). 
176 The federal court did not have to follow the style associated with such writs, however, 
because the Process Act made other provisions for styles. The Act provided, regarding style, 
That all writs and processes issuing from a supreme or a circuit court shall bear test of 
the chief justice of the supreme court, and if from a district court, shall bear test of the 
judge of such court, and shall be under the seal of the court from whence they issue; 
and signed by the clerk thereof. 
Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 93.  
177 See supra notes 113–18 and accompanying text. 
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and modes of process for circuit and district courts, Congress instead 
tethered federal courts to the forms of writs and modes of process that 
prevailed in state courts.178 
For cases of equity and admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the Pro-
cess Act of 1789 provided that “the forms and modes of proceedings . . . 
shall be according to the course of the civil law.”179 Professor Goebel 
suggested that Congress drafted this provision “in haste.”180 It is not 
clear whether “civil law” referred generally to that body of law derived 
from Roman law, or more specifically to English law governing the pre-
rogative courts of chancery and admiralty. (The prerogative courts in 
England were described as using “civil law,” and practitioners in those 
courts were known as “civilians.”181) If the former, it may have been un-
realistic to expect lawyers and judges schooled in English law to employ 
it, given their unfamiliarity with this body of law and the prevailing 
prejudices against it.182 Whatever Congress meant by “civil law,” it does 
not appear that, for cases in equity, Congress could have simply bor-
rowed state forms of proceeding, as it had done for actions at law. At the 
time, it was unclear whether all states had fully functioning equity 
courts.183 Perhaps unartfully, then, the First Process Act specified a uni-
tary source of the forms and modes of proceeding in cases in equity and 
admiralty in federal courts—namely, the “civil law.” Congress clarified 
 
178 In Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 27 (1825), Chief Justice Marshall, writ-
ing for the Court, described his understanding of the import of the Process Act of 1789. First, 
he acknowledged that although the Act addresses only the “form” of writs and executions, it 
“is certainly true” that “form, in this particular . . . has much of substance in it . . . so far as 
respects the object to be accomplished.” Id. He further distinguished “forms of writs and ex-
ecutions” from “modes of process” by describing the latter as having a more “extensive” op-
eration, applying “to every step taken in a cause,” not just writs and executions. Id. at 27–28. 
179 Act of Sept. 29, 1789 § 2, 1 Stat. at 93–94. 
180 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 534. 
181 Langbein, Lerner & Smith, supra note 102, at 190–98. 
182 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 534. Professor Kristin Collins describes this provision as 
“riddled with ambiguity.” Collins, supra note 17, at 271. 
183 See The Federalist No. 83, at 502 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(stating that “[i]n Georgia there are none but common-law courts”). A recent article argues 
that Hamilton was mistaken and that “Georgia’s post-revolutionary courts were given equity 
power; and such power was exercised by the courts, albeit sparingly.” Steven Schaikewitz, 
Examining Georgia’s Equitable Roots: Debunking the Myth that Georgia’s Post-
Revolutionary Courts Eschewed Equity Jurisdiction, 20 J. S. Legal Hist. 79, 87 (2012). The 
important point for present purposes is that, whether or not Georgia’s courts had equity ju-
risdiction, the (mis)perception at the time that they did not may have influenced Congress’s 
decision not to borrow state forms of proceeding in equity cases adjudicated in federal court. 
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this feature of the Process Act when it reenacted the statute in 1792, as 
explained below. 
Before turning to the 1792 Act, however, it is worth briefly examin-
ing the ways in which the Process Act of 1789 qualified the more gen-
eral authorization of Section 14 of the First Judiciary Act. As explained, 
Section 14 authorized federal courts to issue writs “agreeable to the 
principles and usages of law.”184 Such “principles and usages of law” in 
theory could have referred either to traditional English common law or 
to distinctive state common law. (In time, the Supreme Court came to 
hold that “the principles and usages of law” in fact referred to both Eng-
lish and state law.185) The general language of Section 14, if left to gov-
ern inferior federal courts on its own, would have given them an array of 
law from which to choose. At the time, the form and availability of 
common law remedies varied in significant ways from state to state, and 
among American states and England.186 The Process Act narrowed Sec-
tion 14’s broad terms by limiting federal circuit and district courts to the 
forms of action that prevailed in the states in which they sat.187 The Pro-
cess Act also narrowed the authority of federal courts under Section 17 
of the First Judiciary Act. Section 17 conferred broad authority on feder-
al courts “to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly con-
ducting business in the said courts, provided such rules are not repug-
nant to the laws of the United States.”188 The Process Act constrained 
this power by requiring circuit and district courts to follow state modes 
of process.189 It is important to note, however, that the Process Act did 
not render Section 14 obsolete. Section 14 was the primary authority 
governing the writs available in the Supreme Court of the United States, 
and it continued to perform this function.190 Moreover, as explained be-
low, when Congress later amended the Process Act in 1792 to give fed-
 
184 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82. 
185 See infra note 209 and accompanying text. 
186 See supra notes 129–33 and accompanying text. 
187 In 1825 in Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 57 (1825), 
the Court observed that Congress enacted the Process Act of 1789 because the “latitude of 
discretion” provided by § 14 of the First Judiciary Act “was not deemed expedient to be left 
with the Courts.” 
188 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 17, 1 Stat. at 83. 
189 Because the Process Act adopted state modes of process as governing law in federal 
courts, contrary law applied by federal courts would be “repugnant to the laws of the United 
States,” and thus precluded by § 17 itself. Id. 
190 For an example of how the Supreme Court understood § 14 in this regard, see infra note 
228 and accompanying text.  
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eral courts some authority to alter the forms of proceeding they bor-
rowed from state law, Section 14 continued to provide a limit on how far 
federal courts could exercise this authority. 
b. Developments from 1789–92 
After Congress enacted the first Process Act, federal circuit and dis-
trict courts proceeded to follow the forms of writs and modes of process 
in use in the supreme court of the state in which they sat in actions at 
law.191 “This system,” Maeva Marcus has observed, “while undoubtedly 
confusing for justices of the Supreme Court, must have been popular 
with the clerks of court and with practitioners, who were spared the ne-
cessity of familiarizing themselves with a new set of federal rules.”192  In 
cases in equity, however, it is unclear how strictly federal courts com-
plied with the Process Act’s directive to follow “the course of the civil 
law.”193 According to Professor Goebel, “[b]ecause the legal profession 
was hardly prepared to go to school to execute literally the injunction of 
the first Process Act, existing chancery practice was bound to be treated 
as substantial compliance.”194 In 1791, the Supreme Court promulgated 
an order adopting the rules of chancery to “afford[] outlines for the prac-
tice” of the Supreme Court in equity cases.195 It appears that circuit and 
district courts, however, resorted to local equity practices where they ex-
isted.196 Thus, while the first Process Act remained in effect, lower fed-
eral courts generally appear to have followed state forms and modes of 
proceeding in both actions at law and cases in equity. 
Congress quickly realized that the Process Act had its flaws. Amid criti-
cism for tying equity jurisdiction to the civil law and suggestions for some 
degree of greater uniformity in the forms of executions in federal court,197 
 
191 4 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800, 
supra note 21, at 113. 
192 Id. 
193 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93 (repealed 1792). 
194 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 580. 
195 Sup. Ct. R. VII, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) xv, xvi (1804) (issued Aug. 8, 1791).  
196 See 1 Goebel, supra note 22, at 580–85; Collins, supra note 17, at 271.  
197 In his 1790 report on the judiciary, Attorney General Edmund Randolph criticized the 
Process Act for requiring equity to proceed according to the civil law, and he suggested 
some change in the forms of executions used in federal courts. Edmund Randolph, Judiciary 
System, H.R. Rep. No. 1-17, at 21, 24–25 (3d Sess. 1790). In December 1790, President 
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Congress revised and reenacted the Process Act just three years later in 
1792.198 
c. The Process Act of 1792 
Congress provided a more permanent solution to the problem of the 
forms and modes of proceeding to be used in lower federal courts when 
it enacted the Process Act of 1792. The 1792 Act continued key provi-
sions of the 1789 Act, but also made some notable changes. 
First, the Act provided that “the forms of writs, executions and other 
process, except their style and the forms and modes of proceeding in 
suits in those of common law shall be the same as are now used in the 
said courts respectively in pursuance of [the Process Act of 1789].”199 In 
this provision, Congress continued the requirement of the original Pro-
cess Act that federal courts apply state forms of writs. In the second Pro-
cess Act, however, Congress replaced the phrase “mode of process” with 
the phrase “forms and modes of proceeding.” It is unclear why Congress 
made this change, but, whatever the reason, the new language only 
strengthened the directive that federal courts apply state forms of pro-
ceeding—and therefore state causes of action—in cases at law. In the 
eighteenth century, courts in England and America routinely used the 
phrases “form of proceeding” and “mode of proceeding” to define not 
only what we think of today as “procedure,”200 but also the causes of ac-
tion that gave plaintiffs a right to a legal remedy.201 The Process Act of 
 
Washington suggested that Congress might enact “an uniform process of execution on sen-
tences issuing from the Federal Courts.” H. Journal, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 332 (1790).  
198 Prior to the 1792 revision, Congress continued the Process Act in additional interim 
measures. Act of Feb. 18, 1791, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 191; Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 13, 1 Stat. 123. 
199 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872). 
200 See, e.g., The King v. Almon, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 94 (K.B.) 101; Wilm. 243, 259 (de-
scribing attachment and trial by jury as different “modes of proceeding”). 
201 See e.g., Jefferson v. Bishop of Durham, (1797) 126 Eng. Rep. 804 (C.P.) 813; 1 Bos. 
& Pul. 105, 122 (Eyre, C.J.) (“As far as can be collected from the text writers of a very early 
period, and from the forms of proceeding contained in books of very high authority, such as 
the Register and Fitzherbert’s Natura Brevium, it seems that there did not occur in practice, 
and that there was not in fact any remedy at common law against churchmen committing 
waste, sufficiently known for them to treat of.”); Farr v. Newman, (1792) 100 Eng. Rep. 
1209 (K.B.) 1224; 4 T. R. 621, 648 (Kenyon, C.J.) (describing different “form of proceed-
ings” for actions against executors); Hobson v. Todd, (1790) 100 Eng. Rep. 900 (K.B.) 901; 
4 T. R. 71, 74 (opinion of Buller, J.) (describing “the old writ of admeasurement of pasture” 
and explaining that “[b]y that mode of proceeding, if the defendant put more cattle on the 
common than he ought, the plaintiff was entitled to have a certain quantity admeasured to the 
defendant; the excess then is the injury in these cases”); Hancock v. Haywood (1789) 100 
Eng. Rep. 661 (K.B.) 662; 3 T. R. 433, 434 (argument of counsel, with respect to whether 
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1792 thus cemented Congress’s adoption of state law causes of action as 
the proper legal actions to be used in federal court. In time, the Supreme 
Court interpreted this provision to require “static” conformity to state 
forms and modes of proceeding—in other words, conformity to state 
forms and modes of proceeding as they existed in 1792 when the Act 
was adopted, rather than conformity to how they might develop in the 
future.202 
Second, the Process Act of 1792 changed the source of law governing 
cases in equity and admiralty jurisdiction. Under the 1789 Process Act, 
federal courts were to follow “the civil law” in adjudicating equity and 
admiralty cases.203 In an apparent reference to the English court system, 
the 1792 Process Act provided that the “forms and modes of proceed-
ing” in cases “of equity” and “of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction” 
were to be “according to the principles, rules and usages which belong 
to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively, as contradis-
tinguished from courts of common law.”204 Congress thus adopted tradi-
tional English forms of proceeding in equity and admiralty as causes of 
action for federal courts, and abandoned any reference to the civil law.205 
 
assignees could bring one action for separate debts, that “[i]n the first place, it is a great ob-
jection to the form of an action, that it is perfectly new: no instance of this mode of proceed-
ing has ever occurred”); Mason v. Sainsbury, (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 538 (K.B.) 539; 3 Dougl. 
61, 63 (quoting argument of counsel that “though it is true that a man who has two remedies 
may pursue either of them, and that it is no defence to say he has another mode of proceed-
ing, yet, where he has once availed himself of one remedy, and recovered, he shall not be 
allowed to pursue the other”); Rex v. Blooer, (1760) 97 Eng. Rep. 697 (K.B.) 698; 2 Burr. 
1043, 1045 (“A mandamus to restore is the true specific remedy where a person is wrongful-
ly dispossessed of any office or function which draws after it temporal rights; in all cases 
where the established course of law has not provided a specific remedy by another form of 
proceeding . . . .”); see also Black v. Digges’s Ex’r, 1 H. & McH. 153, 155 (Md. 1744) 
(“That indebitatus assumpsit will not lie but where debt will lie. . . . That neither indebitatus 
assumpsit nor debt will lie upon any collateral undertaking, though assumpsit will, and the 
difference between the actions arises from the different form of proceeding.”). 
202 Bank of the U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 59 (1825); Wayman v. Southard, 
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 49–50 (1825). 
203 See supra notes 179–83 and accompanying text. 
204 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872). 
205 In 1832 in Bains v. The James and Catherine, 2 F. Cas. 410 (C.C.D. Pa. 1832) (No. 
756), Justice Henry Baldwin, as Circuit Justice, explained that both § 14 of the First Judici-
ary Act and the Process Act of 1792 excluded federal courts from resorting to the civil law:  
We must then resort to that system of jurisprudence, in which there are courts of 
common law, as contradistinguished from courts of equity and admiralty; to resort to 
the civil law for the rules which define the respective jurisdiction of these courts, 
when congress have excluded them as to the forms and modes of proceeding, would 
be manifestly opposed to the law. 
Id. at 420. 
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Third, the Process Act of 1792 added a grant of residual authority to 
federal courts to make “such alterations and additions as the said courts 
respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient.”206 Relatedly, the 
Act authorized the Supreme Court to make “such regulations as [it] shall 
think proper from time to time by rule to prescribe to any circuit or dis-
trict court concerning the same.”207 These provisions granted federal 
courts some discretion to alter or amend state forms of proceeding at law 
and traditional forms of proceedings in equity and admiralty. Over time, 
however, the Marshall Court made clear that Section 14 of the Judiciary 
Act cabined the residual authority of federal courts to alter state forms of 
proceeding under the Process Act of 1792. Under Section 14 of the Judi-
ciary Act, federal courts could only issue writs that were “agreeable to 
the principles and usages of law.”208 The Supreme Court interpreted this 
provision to authorize federal courts to issue writs agreeable to tradition-
al common law principles or to developing state common law prac-
tice.209 Accordingly, the Court concluded that federal courts could exer-
cise their residual authority under the Process Act of 1792 to alter or 
amend legal forms of proceeding only within the bounds of established 
common law principles or state law. As explained in Section II.A, Eng-
lish courts lacked power to create new forms of proceeding, but they un-
derstood themselves to have some flexibility to mold existing forms of 
proceeding to meet new exigencies. The Court interpreted the Process 
Act’s residual grant of authority to federal courts, in keeping with this 
tradition, to require adherence to state law or traditional common law 
principles, not to allow the creation of completely new forms of pro-
ceeding. 
 
206 Act of May 8, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. at 276. 
207 Id. 
208 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 82. 
209 In United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694), Chief Justice 
Marshall, as Circuit Justice, “underst[ood] those general principles and those general usages” 
to be such as are “found not in the legislative acts of any particular state, but in that generally 
recognised and long established law, which forms the substratum of the laws of every state.” 
Id. at 188. In 1825 in Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825), 
the Court understood “principles and usages of law” to refer both to writs authorized by the 
common law and to writs unknown to the common law but authorized under state law:  
It was well known to Congress, that there were in use in the State Courts, writs of ex-
ecution, other than such as were conformable to the usages of the common law. And it 
is reasonable to conclude, that such were intended to be included under the general 
description of writs agreeable to the principles and usages of law. 
Id. at 56.  
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Over time, federal courts exercised their limited power to alter or 
amend state forms of proceeding in two circumstances. Sometimes, fed-
eral courts used their residual authority to adopt state forms of proceed-
ing that emerged after 1792.210 As explained, the Supreme Court inter-
preted the Process Act of 1792 to require “static” conformity to state law 
as it existed in 1792.211 When the application of outdated state forms of 
proceeding proved inconvenient or unfair, federal courts sometimes ex-
ercised their residual authority to employ more current state forms of 
proceeding. In addition, the Supreme Court used its discretion under the 
Act to adopt rules of practice for cases within the federal courts’ equity 
jurisdiction in 1822 and 1842.212 
d. Developments After 1792 
The Process Act of 1792 established a framework that federal courts 
quickly internalized and rarely had occasion to discuss in their opinions. 
This framework continued in force until 1872, when Congress replaced 
it with the first Conformity Act. Whereas the Process Act of 1792, as in-
terpreted by the Court, required “static” conformity to state forms of 
proceeding as they existed in 1792, the Conformity Act adopted a prin-
ciple of “dynamic” conformity, directing federal courts to apply state le-
 
210 The Supreme Court held in Bank of United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 
59–60 (1825), and Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42, 47 (1825), that this was 
an appropriate use of the discretion conferred by the 1792 Act and not an exercise of uncon-
stitutionally delegated legislative authority.  
In addition to the problem of whether to adopt subsequently developed state forms of pro-
ceeding, courts also faced the problem of what forms of proceeding to apply in states that 
adopted aspects of the civil law, not the common law distinction between law and equity, 
and newly admitted states that had no forms of proceeding in 1792. Eventually, Congress 
enacted laws to address these problems. In 1834, Congress enacted a special process act for 
Louisiana, Act of May 26, 1824, ch. 181, § 1, 4 Stat. 62, 62–63, and in 1828 Congress 
adopted a process for newly admitted states that adopted state forms of proceeding in actions 
at law and required proceedings in equity to be conducted “according to the principles, rules 
and usages which belong to courts of equity.” The Process Act of 1828, ch. 68, 4 Stat. 278, 
278–80.  
Moreover, because the Supreme Court would hold that federal law, not state law, deter-
mined whether a case was legal or equitable, see Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 
212, 222–23 (1818), federal courts in theory might have to adopt legal forms of proceeding 
to cover cases that state law deemed equitable but federal law deemed legal. 
211 See supra text accompanying note 202. 
212 Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the U.S., 42 U.S. (1 How.) xli, xli–lxx 
(1842); Rules of Practice for the Courts of Equity of the U.S., 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v, v–xiii 
(1822).   
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gal forms of proceeding “existing at the time” the case was heard.213 In 
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, with the rise of 
code pleading, the source of the causes of action available in state and 
federal courts gradually shifted from the realm of “procedure” to the 
realm of “substance.”214 Even as this shift occurred, however, federal 
courts continued to apply state law under applicable federal statutes. If 
states still applied traditional common law forms of action, then federal 
courts applied them under the Conformity Act. If, on the other hand, 
states enacted statutes abolishing forms of proceeding and defining 
causes of action outside the realm of procedure, then federal courts ap-
plied the resulting state causes of action as “rules of decision” under 
Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act. 
Of course, during the reign of both the Process Acts and the Conform-
ity Act, much of state law was unwritten law, and, in time, federal courts 
took advantage of this circumstance to increase their own authority. Un-
der an expanding “Swift doctrine,” federal courts exercised independent 
judgment in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to determine the 
content of so-called “general law” applied in federal court. The doctrine 
earned its name from Swift v. Tyson,215 an 1842 decision in which the 
Supreme Court exercised independent judgment to determine the content 
of general commercial law in a diversity case. As we have discussed 
elsewhere, the Court’s approach was largely defensible in 1842 as ap-
plied to matters—such as commercial law—that the states themselves 
considered to be governed by general law.216 Following the Civil War, 
however, the Supreme Court expanded the Swift doctrine by increasingly 
treating traditionally local matters—such as torts—as governed by gen-
eral law.217 This enabled federal courts to exercise independent judgment 
as to the content of such law and to disregard unwritten local state law. 
Even under the Swift doctrine, however, federal courts continued to 
use state forms of proceeding to adjudicate common law actions within 
their jurisdiction. The use of general law in such cases did not affect the 
form of proceeding available under the Process Act or the Conformity 
Act, but rather went to the validity of the underlying right, title, or privi-
lege at issue in the case. Swift itself illustrates this distinction. Swift was 
 
213 Conformity Act of 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 196, 197 (repealed 1934). 
214 See Bellia, supra note 99, at 792–99 (describing this process). 
215 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18–19 (1842). 
216 Bellia & Clark, General Law in Federal Court, supra note 91, at 687–93. 
217 Id. at 697–701. 
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a diversity suit in which Swift sued Tyson to recover payment due under 
a bill of exchange. Tyson originally gave the bill of exchange to two 
land speculators as payment for a parcel of land they purported to 
own.218 The speculators, in turn, gave the bill of exchange to Swift in 
payment of a preexisting debt.219 When Swift sought payment from Ty-
son, Tyson refused on the ground that the speculators had fraudulently 
induced him to buy land that they did not actually own.220 Swift argued 
that Tyson’s defense was inapplicable to him because he gave valuable 
consideration for the instrument (by releasing a preexisting debt), and 
was thus a bona fide holder against the issuer. 
Swift sued Tyson in New York federal court on the basis of diversity 
of citizenship jurisdiction. Swift brought an action on the bill of ex-
change. The appropriate action in such a case at law was an action in as-
sumpsit—the same writ or form of proceeding that would have been 
used if the action had been brought in New York state court.221 When the 
case reached the Supreme Court, the Court did not suggest that general 
law governed the form of action needed to initiate the lawsuit. Rather, 
the Court applied general law to decide the underlying rights and obliga-
tions of the parties. If release of a preexisting debt was valid considera-
tion, then Swift was a bona fide holder, and Tyson’s defense would fail. 
If, on the other hand, release of a preexisting debt was not valid consid-
eration, then Tyson’s defense would succeed. In either case, the Process 
Act—rather than general law—supplied the cause of action needed to 
initiate the suit. The Court looked to general commercial law not for the 
cause of action, but to determine the parties’ respective underlying 
rights. As the Swift Court put it, “[T]he only real question in the cause is, 
 
218 Swift, 41 U.S. at 14–15. 
219 Id. 
220 Id. at 15. 
221 In the New York state court cases that the Swift Court discussed in considering the con-
tent of the applicable rule of general commercial law, the underlying actions at law were ac-
tions in assumpsit. See, e.g., Bank of Sandusky v. Scoville, 24 Wend. 115, 115 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1840) (“This was an action of assumpsit.”); Bank of Salina v. Babcock, 21 Wend. 499, 
499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839) (same); Ontario Bank v. Worthington, 12 Wend. 593, 593 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1834) (same); Rosa v. Brotherson, 10 Wend. 85, 85 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833) (same); 
Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239, 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (same). At the time, federal courts 
routinely adjudged disputes involving bills of exchange through actions in assumpsit, see, 
e.g., Evans v. Gee, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 80, 81 (1837) (reviewing an “action of assump-
sit . . .  founded on a bill of exchange”), or, where appropriate under state law, actions of 
debt, see, e.g., Raborg v. Peyton, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 385, 385 (1817), discussed infra notes 
256–60 and accompanying text. 
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whether, under the circumstances of the present case, such a preexisting 
debt constitutes a valuable consideration in the sense of the general rule 
applicable to negotiable instruments.”222 The Court looked to general 
law to decide this question and ruled in favor of Swift. 
Swift was controversial not because it attempted to dictate the forms 
of proceeding used in diversity cases, but because it allowed federal 
courts to decide questions of general law in a manner contrary to the 
conclusions reached by state courts applying the same law. Although we 
have argued that Swift itself was defensible when decided, over time 
federal courts expanded the Swift doctrine into a means of disregarding 
state law in favor of their own conception of general law.223 In 1938, in 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, the Supreme Court declared the Swift 
doctrine to be unconstitutional, and instructed federal courts to apply the 
substantive law of the state in which they sat, including the decisions of 
state courts governing the content of so-called “general law.”224 The im-
portant point for present purposes, however, is that during the Swift era 
federal courts continued to use state forms of proceeding pursuant to the 
Process Act of 1792 and the Conformity Act of 1872. 
In 1938, federal courts also finally promulgated their own uniform 
rules of procedure. In 1934, Congress repealed the Conformity Act when 
it adopted the Rules Enabling Act. The Rules Enabling Act authorized 
the Supreme Court to prescribe uniform rules of procedure for federal 
courts,225 and the Supreme Court ousted the old forms of action from 
federal court in 1938 in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.226 Accord-
ingly, 1938 marked a major turning point for the federal court system. 
Prior to 1938, federal courts employed state forms of proceeding under 
the Conformity Act, but applied their own conceptions of general law 
under Swift. After 1938, federal courts employed their own uniform pro-
cedures under the Rules Enabling Act, but applied the substantive law of 
the state in which they sat under Erie. Although much changed at this 
time for federal courts, one thing remained the same. Absent contrary 
federal law, federal courts looked to state law to define the causes of ac-
 
222 Swift, 41 U.S. at 16. 
223 See Bellia & Clark, General Law in Federal Court, supra note 91, at 697–701. 
224 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
225 Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012)). 
226 308 U.S. 645 (1938). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there are no particu-
lar forms of proceeding for cases at law or in equity; there is simply “one form of action—
the civil action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 2.  
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tion they adjudicated, absent more-specific direction from Congress. 
Prior to 1938, federal courts borrowed such causes as procedural law 
under the Process Act and the Conformity Act, or, where states had 
abandoned the forms of action, applied such causes as rules of decision 
under Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act (the Rules of Decision Act). 
After 1938, federal courts unequivocally applied such causes of action 
as substantive law under Erie and the Rules of Decision Act. 
III. THE CAUSE OF ACTION IN EARLY FEDERAL COURTS 
As discussed, the First Judiciary Act and the Process Acts specified 
the forms of proceeding—and therefore the causes of action—that the 
newly-established federal courts could adjudicate. Section 14 of the First 
Judiciary Act authorized federal courts to issue writs that were agreeable 
to established principles of law. Days later, however, Congress provided 
federal courts with more-specific direction. The Process Acts of 1789 
and 1792 required federal courts to apply state causes of action and pro-
cedures in cases at law, and traditional equitable actions and procedures 
in cases in equity. Congress gave federal courts residual authority to 
mold these forms and modes of proceeding, but not to go beyond the re-
quirements of state law or traditional common law practice. Early feder-
al courts followed these statutes for the better part of a century, typically 
with no need to cite or mention them. 
The fact that the Process Acts were relatively uncontroversial when 
they governed does not diminish their historical importance for under-
standing the nature of the judicial power exercised by early federal 
courts. There are several possible reasons why judges and scholars have 
not discussed the Process Acts today in connection with debates over 
federal judicial power to recognize new causes of action. First, the Acts 
used terms of art that we no longer associate with causes of action. Alt-
hough judges and lawmakers generally do not use the phrase “form of 
proceeding” to refer to a cause of action today, they did in 1789. Second, 
early federal judges and lawyers rarely found it necessary to articulate 
that the Process Acts were the ultimate source of the causes of action in 
the civil cases they handled. Rather, judges and lawyers simply fell into 
the habit of using state forms of proceeding—and thus borrowing state 
causes of action—in federal court cases. Finally, once the Process Acts 
established the use of state forms of action as the proper background rule 
in actions at law, there was no real dispute about their application. Ac-
cordingly, today’s courts and scholars will not find many early federal 
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court decisions that identify the Process Acts as the source of authority 
for the causes of action under adjudication. 
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the federal courts’ 
failure to cite the Process Acts in routine cases suggests that such courts 
considered themselves free to ignore the Acts’ instructions and instead 
derive causes of action from ambient general common law. Today, by 
analogy, federal judges rarely recite well-established statutory directives 
unless they are actually contested—such as the background principles 
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in federal court, that di-
versity cases require diverse parties and a minimum amount in contro-
versy, or that state law supplies the applicable rules of decision unless 
preempted by contrary federal law. The First Congress required the new-
ly created lower federal courts to use existing state common law forms 
of action, at least in part, to facilitate adjudication in federal court by 
lawyers and judges familiar with state practice. Judges and lawyers in 
the early republic quickly understood that state forms and modes of pro-
ceeding—the forms and modes of proceeding that they had long used in 
state courts—now also applied in actions at law in federal courts, and 
they had no reason to discuss this requirement in every case. It was more 
natural for litigants and judges simply to apply those forms and modes 
rather than to recite repeatedly Congress’s command that they borrow 
them.227 
On those rare occasions when early federal courts did address the 
source of their power to adjudicate a particular cause of action, it was 
because they had to resolve a dispute over their power to do so. The Su-
preme Court made clear early on that federal courts could only adjudi-
cate forms of action that Congress had authorized them to hear.228 The 
 
227 The same practice prevailed when early federal courts enforced local common law as 
rules of decision in diversity cases. Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act required application 
of such law, but federal courts did not consider it necessary to recite that provision in every 
case. See Bellia & Clark, General Law in Federal Court, supra note 91, at 669–77 (describ-
ing early federal courts’ application of local state law as rules of decision). That federal 
courts applied local common law without citing § 34 does not negate the fact that § 34 re-
quired this approach. In the same way, that federal courts did not typically recite that the 
Process Acts required application of state forms of proceeding in actions at law does not ne-
gate the existence of that requirement. 
228 For example, in Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93–94 (1807), when Chief 
Justice Marshall addressed the power of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus under 
§ 14, he emphasized that federal courts only could issue writs that Congress authorized them 
to issue. Although federal courts could resort to the common law for the meaning of a term 
such as “habeas corpus,” “the power to award the writ by any of the courts of the United 
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most revealing cases about the source of causes of action in early federal 
courts are those in which a dispute arose regarding the source of law de-
fining the cause of action. In some cases, litigants disputed the proper 
form of proceeding in federal court. In other cases, federal courts had to 
decide whether they were borrowing state law as a form of proceeding 
under the Process Acts or applying state law as a rule of decision under 
Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act. When such disputes arose, federal 
courts expressed their understanding that under the Process Acts state 
law, not general common law, defined the applicable causes of action in 
cases at law. Likewise, federal courts expressed their understanding that 
the Process Acts, not ambient general common law, required them to 
apply traditional causes of action in equity and admiralty in the exercise 
of those respective jurisdictions. 
This Part will recount how early federal courts understood the source 
of their authority to adjudicate causes of action under the Process Acts, 
both in actions at law and in cases in equity and admiralty. Before doing 
so, however, it is worthwhile to recount briefly the early federal courts’ 
approach to federal common law crimes. In important respects, the way 
in which early federal courts approached their power to adjudicate 
common law crimes contrasts with the way in which they approached 
civil causes of action. 
A. Federal Common Law Crimes 
To understand the source of causes of action in civil cases adjudicated 
by early federal courts, it is useful to examine the source of the cause of 
action in early federal criminal cases. Unlike Congress’s decision to 
specify the causes of action available in civil cases, Congress specified 
very few federal crimes in the early republic. The Judiciary Act of 1789 
gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction to hear crimes and offenses 
“cognizable under the authority of the United States.”229 The Judiciary 
Act itself, however, established no federal crimes. A year later, Congress 
adopted the Crimes Act of 1790,230 which specified only a handful of 
federal offenses. Some early federal executive officials and federal judg-
 
States, must be given by written law.” Id. That written law included not only § 14, but the 
Process Acts as well. When disputes arose over the power of federal courts to adjudicate a 
particular cause of action, courts analyzed their authority under these statutes. 
229 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (conferring jurisdiction on district 
courts); id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78–79 (conferring jurisdiction on circuit courts). 
230 Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. 
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es attempted to fill out the federal penal code with federal common law 
crimes. For two decades following ratification, judges and other public 
officials debated whether federal courts had authority to adjudicate fed-
eral common law crimes—that is, crimes against the United States that 
Congress had neither created nor authorized.231 Almost all early Su-
preme Court Justices initially embraced federal common law crimes 
while riding circuit. The Court itself, however, did not consider the issue 
until 1812 when it rejected federal common law crimes in United States 
v. Hudson & Goodwin.232 Although Hudson & Goodwin settled the 
question moving forward, one might question whether early federal ju-
dicial recognition of common law crimes suggests that federal judges 
likewise would have understood themselves to have the power to recog-
nize common law causes of action in civil cases, even absent the direc-
tion Congress provided in the Process Acts. Understood in historical 
context, however, the nation’s experience with federal common law 
crimes tends to refute—rather than support—this suggestion. 
Following the Declaration of Independence, the individual American 
states took affirmative steps to receive the common law of England as 
their own law.233 Accordingly, both before and after the ratification of 
the Constitution, states prosecuted their citizens for traditional common 
law crimes such as murder, assault, battery, arson, burglary, trespass, 
and bribery. The Constitution did not purport to adopt the common law 
of England for the United States as a whole and Congress never attempt-
ed to do so by statute. Nonetheless, some early federal officials assumed 
that the United States had somehow adopted the common law and that 
the common law could support certain criminal prosecutions in federal 
court. For example, in his famous Neutrality Proclamation of 1793, 
President Washington declared that the United States would remain neu-
tral in the war between Britain and France and gave “instructions to 
those officers to whom it belongs, to cause prosecutions to be instituted 
against all persons, who shall . . . violate the law of nations, with respect 
to the powers at war.”234 This proclamation was tested when Gideon 
Henfield (an American citizen) assisted the French war effort by serving 
 
231 For a discussion of the early debate over federal common law crimes, see Bellia & 
Clark, Federal Common Law of Nations, supra note 125, at 47–55. 
232 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
233 See supra notes 125–33 and accompanying text. 
234 32 George Washington, Proclamation of Neutrality: Philadelphia, April 22, 1793, in 
The Writings of George Washington 430, 430–31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931). 
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as the captain of a privateer that sailed out of an American port and cap-
tured a British ship.235 When Henfield brought the ship to Philadelphia, 
he was arrested and criminally charged with violating neutrality. 
Justice Wilson, sitting as a circuit judge, instructed the grand jury that 
“the common law” had been “received in America,” that “the law of na-
tions” to “its full extent is adopted by her,” and that “infractions of that 
law form a part of her code of criminal jurisprudence.”236 The grand jury 
returned an indictment and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, Hen-
field’s counsel argued that because there was no statute, “the court could 
take no cognizance of the offense.”237 The circuit court (consisting of 
Justice Wilson, Justice Iredell, and Judge Peters) rejected this view and 
instructed the jury accordingly. The jury acquitted Henfield without ex-
planation, and Congress quickly enacted the Neutrality Act to augment 
the Neutrality Proclamation and make conduct like Henfield’s a statuto-
ry crime going forward.238 
Notwithstanding Henfield’s acquittal, lower federal courts continued 
to permit federal common law prosecutions during the 1790s. In 1798, 
however, Justice Chase became the first Justice to question the legitima-
cy of federal common law crimes. In United States v. Worrall,239 the 
government charged the defendant with attempting to bribe a Federal 
Commissioner of Revenue. Because no federal statute made such con-
duct a crime, Worrall’s counsel argued that the circuit court could not 
take cognizance of the crime charged in the indictment.240 His counsel 
also argued that “[t]he nature of our Federal compact, will not . . . toler-
ate this doctrine” of federal common law crimes.241 The United States 
Attorney responded that the circuit court could punish the offense “upon 
the principles of common law punishment.”242 Justice Chase rejected 
this proposition, stating that it is “essential, that Congress should define 
the offences to be tried, and apportion the punishments to be inflict-
ed.”243 
 
235 Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1110–13 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360). 
236 Id. at 1106–07. 
237 Id. at 1119. 
238 Ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381 (1794).  
239 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384 (1798). 
240 Id. at 389. 
241 Id. at 391. 
242 Id. at 392. 
243 Id. at 394. Judge Peters disagreed with Justice Chase, and the court sought to put this 
case “into such a form, as would admit of obtaining the ultimate decision of the Supreme 
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Justice Chase’s skepticism ultimately prevailed both in the realm of 
public opinion and in the Supreme Court. Congress passed the Sedition 
Act in 1798 and a debate erupted over its constitutionality. The Act 
made it a crime to “write, print, utter or publish . . . any false, scandalous 
and malicious” statements about Congress, the government, or the Pres-
ident.244 Republicans argued that the Act exceeded Congress’s enumer-
ated powers and violated the Bill of Rights as well. Federalists respond-
ed that “the Act presented no ‘constitutional difficulty’ because the 
federal courts were already authorized to punish seditious libel as a 
common-law crime.”245 Republicans, in turn, denied the Federalists’ 
premise “‘that the common or unwritten law’ . . . makes a part of the law 
of these States, in their united and national capacity.”246 
The issue became part of Thomas Jefferson’s presidential campaign 
of 1800 with James Madison leading the charge against the Sedition Act 
and the idea of federal common law crimes. Madison advanced two 
main constitutional arguments. First, he argued that the incorporation of 
the common law would be inconsistent with the Constitution’s enumera-
tion of limited federal powers. In his view, such incorporation would 
mean that “the authority of Congress [would be] co-extensive with the 
objects of the common law”—that is, Congress “would be authorized to 
legislate in all cases whatsoever.”247 Second, application of the common 
law would “erect [federal judges] into legislators” by requiring them to 
pick and choose which parts of the common law are properly applicable 
to the circumstances of the United States.248 
These arguments appear to have prevailed in the realm of public de-
bate. Jefferson won the election of 1800, and Congress did not renew the 
Sedition Act after it expired. The debate over federal common law 
crimes had all but ended when federal prosecutors charged two Federal-
ist editors, Hudson and Goodwin, with common law seditious libel in 
 
Court, upon the important principle of the discussion.” Id. at 396. Worrall’s counsel object-
ed, and the court imposed a mitigated sentence notwithstanding the division of opinion on 
the court. Id. 
244 Ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596 (1798) (expired 1801). 
245 William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of 
John Jay and Oliver Ellsworth 149 (1995) (quoting Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Timothy 
Pickering (Dec. 12, 1798)). 
246 6 James Madison, Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Jan. 18, 1800), in 
The Writings of James Madison 347, 372 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906). 
247 Id. at 380. 
248 Id. at 381. 
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1806. The case of United States v. Hudson & Goodwin reached the Su-
preme Court in 1812, and the Court rejected federal common law 
crimes. Justice Johnson (President Jefferson’s first appointee to the 
Court) issued a brief opinion on behalf of the Court. He stated the ques-
tion as “whether the Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a 
common law jurisdiction in criminal cases.”249 In apparent reference to 
the debate surrounding the Sedition Act, Johnson remarked that the 
question had long been “settled in public opinion.”250 He concluded by 
proclaiming that before federal courts may exercise jurisdiction in such 
cases, “[t]he legislative authority of the Union must first make an act a 
crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have ju-
risdiction of the offence.”251  
Two decades later, the Court reaffirmed that the United States—as a 
whole—had not adopted the common law. According to the Court:  
It is clear, there can be no common law of the United States. The fed-
eral government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independ-
ent states; each of which may have its local usages, customs and 
common law. There is no principle which pervades the union and has 
the authority of law, that is not embodied in the constitution or laws of 
the union. The common law could be made a part of our federal sys-
tem, only by legislative adoption.252 
The Court’s rejection of a “common law of the United States” negated 
the central premise of the case for federal common law crimes advanced 
by Wilson and others. 
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s ultimate rejection of federal 
common law crimes, one might question whether the initial embrace of 
federal common law crimes by federal judges in the 1790s demonstrates 
an understanding that federal courts could exercise common law powers 
more broadly. If federal courts could recognize and apply federal com-
 
249 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32 (1812). 
250 Id. 
251 Id. at 34. Although he did not dissent, Justice Story apparently did not agree with the 
Court’s decision. The following year while riding circuit, Justice Story issued an opinion 
challenging the correctness of Hudson & Goodwin and attempting to distinguish it as applied 
to crimes within the judiciary’s admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See United States v. 
Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 619, 621 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 14,857). When Coolidge eventually 
reached the Court, it summarily reaffirmed Hudson & Goodwin. See United States v. Coo-
lidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415, 416 (1816). 
252 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834). 
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mon law crimes without congressional authorization, could they also 
unilaterally recognize and apply common law causes of action in civil 
cases? There would be several difficulties with making this leap. 
First, even though early federal judges assumed without much analy-
sis that they could adjudicate federal common law crimes, the Supreme 
Court, upon analysis, summarily rejected this practice. Federal judges 
appointed at the Founding were educated in the English common law 
system and the state court systems modeled after it. It may have been 
natural for early federal judges to assume that they—like their English 
and state counterparts—could recognize and apply common law crimes, 
especially when Congress had given them a criminal jurisdiction. The 
question did not arise often, and the political stakes did not escalate until 
1798, when Congress enacted the Sedition Act. Once Republicans set 
forth the federalism and separation of powers arguments against federal 
common law crimes, Federalist judges had to confront them for the first 
time. When the Supreme Court ultimately addressed these issues, it re-
jected federal common law crimes. 
Second, and relatedly, the notion that federal courts would have judi-
cial power to adjudicate common law civil actions if they had power to 
adjudicate common law crimes ultimately rests on the premise that the 
Constitution somehow adopted the common law for the United States as 
a whole. Although the Constitution certainly borrowed terms of art from 
the common law, it contains no provision purporting to adopt that body 
of law in its entirety. It was Madison’s view that such wholesale incor-
poration would have contradicted the Constitution’s limited and enu-
merated powers. There is evidence that the Founders—like the Eng-
lish—understood the common law to be a complete system for the 
management of all aspects of society.253 If federal courts could have ap-
plied the common law as part of the judicial power, then Congress, by 
further implication, would have had power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to legislate with respect to all aspects of such law. Argu-
ments that Congress had such broad powers—notwithstanding its lim-
ited and enumerated powers under Article I—would have met strong re-
sistance at the time. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme 
 
253 See 9 Annals of Cong. 3012 (1799) (statement of Mr. Nicholas) (describing the com-
mon law of England as “a complete system for the management of all the affairs of a coun-
try”). 
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Court ultimately concluded that “there can be no common law of the 
United States.” 254 
Moreover, arguments that federal courts had authority to recognize 
federal common law crimes often proceeded not from the premise that 
federal courts had authority to apply the common law in general (such as 
the common law of property and contract rights), but rather from the 
premise that federal court adjudication of common law crimes in partic-
ular was necessary for the peace and security of the United States. That 
some judges understood federal courts to have authority to adjudicate 
common law crimes does not necessarily imply that these judges also 
understood themselves to have authority to apply other realms of the 
common law, including civil forms of actions. To the contrary, the ab-
sence of analogous debates about the judiciary’s power to apply other 
realms of the common law, such as property (they simply did not apply 
them), may have more probative value for early understandings of fed-
eral judicial power than the specific debate over federal common law 
crimes. 
Indeed, the intense debate over the propriety of federal common law 
crimes underscores the importance of the Process Acts. By authorizing 
federal courts to use state forms of proceeding in actions at law, the Pro-
cess Acts enabled federal courts to avoid any questions regarding the 
constitutionality of their application of common law forms of action. 
Even while debate raged over the legitimacy of federal common law 
crimes, there was no corresponding debate over the legitimacy of the 
civil forms of action applied by federal courts. No such debate was nec-
essary with respect to civil actions because federal courts had express 
statutory authority to employ state forms of action. It appears that feder-
al courts quickly internalized the authority conferred by the Process Acts 
into their general mode of operation. Because litigants rarely contested 
application of these Acts, courts had little reason to address them in 
most cases.  
B. Actions at Law 
It is worth examining in greater detail how the Process Acts worked 
in practice to supply the cause of action in early federal courts. Pursuant 
to the Process Acts, federal courts routinely applied state forms of pro-
ceeding in actions at law during the first decades following ratification. 
 
254 Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 658. 
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In most common law actions, federal courts presumed that state forms of 
proceeding followed the common law of England. States generally had 
adopted the common law as state law, and state decisions were not wide-
ly reported. Accordingly, absent evidence to the contrary, federal courts 
proceeded on the assumption that states had adopted traditional common 
law forms and modes of proceeding in actions at law. To the extent that 
local lawyers selected the applicable form of proceeding under state law, 
this probably was a fair assumption in most cases. This assumption ex-
tended to pleading requirements,255 evidence,256 and the availability of 
forms of proceeding to certain plaintiffs.257 
The Supreme Court’s 1817 decision in Raborg v. Peyton is illustra-
tive.258 In Raborg, the Court applied “the well-settled doctrine that [an 
action in] debt lies in every case where the common law creates a duty 
 
255 See, e.g., Covington v. Comstock, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 43, 44 (1840) (holding that in “an 
action against the drawer of a note or bill payable at a particular place . . . the place of pay-
ment is a material part in the description of the note, and must be set out in the declaration”); 
Wallace v. McConnell, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 136, 149–50 (1839) (holding, on the basis of “a 
uniform course of decisions for at least thirty years” in American state courts, that in an ac-
tion on a promissory note or bill of exchange, the plaintiff need not aver a demand of pay-
ment, and explaining that “[i]t is of the utmost importance, that all rules relating to commer-
cial law should be stable and uniform”); Pearson v. Bank of the Metropolis, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 
89, 93 (1828) (determining that plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged the agreement in an action 
on a promissory note); Sheehy v. Mandeville, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 208, 217–18 (1812) (de-
termining that for a plaintiff to receive judgment on a promissory note under the common 
law, the note that the plaintiff pleads in the declaration must correspond to the note that the 
plaintiff offers in evidence); Sheehy v. Mandeville, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 253, 264 (1810) (de-
termining that “[s]ince . . . the plaintiff has not taken issue on the averment that the note was 
given and received in discharge of the account, but has demurred to the plea, that fact is ad-
mitted”). 
256 See, e.g., Downes v. Church, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 205, 206 (1839) (determining that plain-
tiff could recover on the second part of a foreign bill of exchange without producing the first 
part); Pearson v. Bank of the Metropolis, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 89, 92 (1828) (determining “that 
there was no error in admitting the parol evidence which was offered to sustain the action”); 
Morgan v. Reintzel, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 273, 275–76 (1812) (determining that the plaintiff, 
in a suit against the maker of a promissory note, was obliged to produce the note upon the 
trial); Wilson v. Codman’s Ex’r, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 193, 209 (1805) (holding, in the absence 
of any cases on point, that “[w]here . . . the averment in the declaration is of a fact dehors the 
written contract, which fact is in itself immaterial . . . the party making the averment, is not 
bound to prove it”); Levy v. Gadsby, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 180, 186 (1805) (addressing whether 
a defendant can give usury as evidence on the plea of non assumpsit). 
257 See, e.g., Harris v. Johnson, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 311, 318 (1806) (holding, in reliance on 
English precedent, that an action could not be “maintained on an original contract for goods 
sold and delivered, by a person who has received a note as a conditional payment, and has 
passed away that note”). 
258 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 385 (1817). 
BELLIA&CLARK_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2015  3:49 PM 
2015] The Original Source of the Cause of Action 669 
for the payment of money, and in every case where there is an express 
contract for the payment of money.”259 On the basis of this doctrine, the 
Court held “that debt lies upon a bill of exchange by an endorsee of the 
bill against the acceptor, when it is expressed to be for value re-
ceived.”260 Although the Court did not recite the Process Act in this case, 
its application of a traditional common law form of proceeding as pre-
sumptive state law was commonplace. 
In some cases, the Supreme Court made this presumption explicit. For 
example, in 1831 in Doe v. Winn, the Court addressed whether a state-
certified copy of a land grant was admissible evidence in an action of 
ejectment.261 As Justice Story explained on behalf of the Court, under 
common law modes of proceeding, “an exemplification of a public grant 
under the great seal, is admissible in evidence.”262 The Court applied this 
common law mode of proceeding on the assumption that it was the law 
of Georgia: 
The common law is the law of Georgia; and the rules of evidence be-
longing to it are in force there, unless so far as they have been modi-
fied by statute, or controlled by a settled course of judicial decisions 
and usage. Upon the present question it does not appear that Georgia 
has ever established any rules at variance with the common 
law . . . .263 
Under this approach, federal courts simply assumed that state law adopt-
ed common law modes of proceeding, unless the state departed from 
them by statute or a settled course of judicial decisions.264 This presump-
 
259 Id. at 389. 
260 Id. 
261 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 233, 241 (1831). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 Justice Story’s earlier opinion in Nicholls v. Webb, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 326 (1823), 
comports with this analysis. In Nicholls, the endorsee of a promissory note brought an action 
against the endorser. For such actions to proceed under the common law, plaintiffs had the 
burden to show that they had made a due demand for payment from the maker and given the 
endorser due notice of non-payment. One question before the Court was whether a protest by 
a notary, who had died before trial, was in itself evidence of a proper demand. Id. at 331–32. 
The Court held that the notary’s protest was not itself sufficient evidence because “[i]t does 
not appear that, by the laws of Tennessee, a demand of the payment of promissory notes is 
required to be made by a notary public, or a protest made for non-payment, or notice given 
by a notary to the endorsers.” Id. at 331. Moreover, “by the general commercial law, it is 
perfectly clear, that the intervention of a notary is unnecessary in these cases.” Id. The Court 
went on, then, to determine whether the notary’s protest was “admissible secondary evi-
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tion simplified the application of the Process Acts and sheds light on 
why the Acts were rarely discussed when litigants did not contest the 
applicable form of proceeding. 
In those relatively rare federal court cases in which litigants disputed 
the proper form of proceeding in actions at law, federal judges were 
more explicit about their duty to apply state forms of proceeding. Such 
disputes arose in two contexts: when litigants disputed the content of 
state law, and when litigants disputed whether an applicable state law 
qualified as a “form of proceeding” under the Process Act or as a “rule 
of decision” under Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act. 
Federal courts expressly referred to state law governing forms of pro-
ceeding when litigants disputed the requirements of state law, or when 
state law departed from traditional common law principles. For instance, 
in 1803 in Mandeville v. Riddle, the parties disputed “[w]hether an ac-
tion of indebitatus assumpsit can be maintained by the assignee of a 
promissory note made in Virginia, against a remote assignor.”265 In an 
opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, the Supreme Court specifically 
looked to the common law of Virginia and determined that an assignee 
could not maintain such an action under such law when there was a lack 
of privity between the assignee and the remote assignor.266 The Court al-
so found that no act of the Virginia Assembly conferred a right to sue in 
such cases.267 Similarly, in Breedlove v. Nicolet, Chief Justice Marshall 
specifically examined Louisiana law to decide whether a plaintiff could 
maintain a particular form of proceeding on a promissory note. 268 The 
 
dence . . . to prove due demand and notice.” Id. at 332. Justice Story began by observing that 
“[c]ourts of law are . . . extremely cautious in the introduction of any new doctrines of evi-
dence which trench upon old and established principles.” Id. Nonetheless, Justice Story con-
tinued, “as the rules of evidence are founded upon general interest and convenience, they 
must, from time to time, admit of modifications, to adapt them to the actual condition and 
business of men, or they would work manifest injustice.” Id. Justice Story proceeded to con-
clude, upon consideration of English and state court precedent—and the importance to 
commerce of the admissibility of such evidence—that the evidence of the deceased notary’s 
protest “was rightly admitted.” Id. at 332–37. This analysis is consistent with the Process 
Act. It appears from Justice Story’s analysis that if Tennessee had a settled practice on this 
question, the Court would have applied Tennessee law. Because Tennessee did not, however, 
the Court presumed that the common law, which the state had adopted, applied. If this rule 
of evidence constituted a form or mode of proceeding, the Court had residual authority in 
any event to settle the question under the Process Act of 1792. 
265 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 290, 298 (1803). 
266 Id. 
267 Id. 
268 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 413, 429 (1833). 
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defendants argued that the plaintiffs could not maintain their action be-
cause they claimed joint and several liability but failed to sue out pro-
cess against all of the alleged obligors on the note. In rejecting this ar-
gument, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged that the fact “that the suit 
is brought against two of three obligors, might be fatal at common 
law.”269 He explained, however, that “the courts of Louisiana do not 
proceed according to the rules of the common law. Their code is found-
ed on the civil law, and our inquiries must be confined to its rules.”270 
The Court applied state law in many other cases to determine the availa-
bility of forms of action.271 The Court also applied state law to determine 
additional “procedural” matters, such as pleading requirements,272 ques-
tions of evidence,273 and statutes of limitations.274 
Federal courts addressed source of law questions not only when liti-
gants disputed the content of state law, but also when questions arose 
regarding whether state law qualified as a “form of proceeding” under 
the Process Acts or as a “rule of decision” under Section 34 of the Judi-
ciary Act.275 Whether state law applied as a “form of proceeding” or as a 
“rule of decision” was important because it could lead to the application 
of different law in certain cases. First, this distinction could determine 
whether a federal court had to apply state law as it existed in 1792, or as 
it existed at the time an action arose. Under the Process Act of 1792, 
federal courts applied state forms of proceeding as they existed when the 
 
269 Id.  
270 Id. 
271 See, e.g., Kirkman v. Hamilton, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 20, 24–25 (1832) (holding that the 
plaintiff could maintain an action of debt under the laws of North Carolina, which incorpo-
rated English law on inland bills of exchange); Bank of the U.S. v. Carneal, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 
543, 547 (1829) (explaining that “[t]he declaration is for money lent and advanced, and the 
suit is authorized to be brought in this form jointly against all the parties to the note, by a 
statute of Ohio”) (opinion of Story, J.). 
272 See, e.g., Wilson v. Lenox, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 194, 210–11 (1803) (holding under a 
Virginia statute that the plaintiff was obliged to plead “[t]he charges of protest[, which] con-
stitute an essential part of the debt” claimed). 
273 See, e.g., Sebree v. Dorr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 558, 560–61 (1824) (explaining that “by 
the statutes of Kentucky, and the substance of these statutes has been incorporated into the 
rules of the Circuit Court . . . no person shall be permitted to deny his signature, as maker or 
as assignor, in a suit against him, founded on instruments of this nature, unless he will make 
an affidavit denying the execution or assignment.”). 
274 See, e.g., Spring v. Ex’rs of Gray, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 151, 163–69 (1832) (interpreting and 
applying Maine statute of limitations); Kirkman, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 23–24 (determining that 
various North Carolina acts did not apply to bar plaintiff’s action of debt). 
275 See supra notes 141, 199 and accompanying text. 
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Act was adopted. In other words, the Process Act required a “static” in-
corporation of state law as the law defining the forms and modes of pro-
ceeding available in federal court.276 By contrast, under Section 34, fed-
eral courts applied state law rules of decision as they existed when the 
cause of action arose.277 
Second, whether state law applied as a “form of proceeding” under 
the Process Act or as a “rule of decision” under Section 34 could deter-
mine whether federal courts had authority to alter or amend the state rule 
in question. Federal courts had no authority to alter or amend rules of 
decision under Section 34, whereas they had some residual authority un-
der the Process Act of 1792 to alter or amend the forms and modes of 
proceeding that they borrowed from state law.278 Thus, in certain cases, 
federal courts had to decide whether a state law was a form or mode of 
proceeding (and thus alterable by federal courts) or a rule of decision 
(and thus unalterable by federal courts).279 
In both of these situations, the Supreme Court considered whether 
certain matters qualified as rules of decision (and were thus fixed by 
state law as of the time an action arose) or forms or modes of proceeding 
(and were thus subject to federal courts’ limited residual authority to up-
date their content as they existed under state law in 1792).280 For exam-
 
276 As the Supreme Court explained it, the Process Acts required static conformity to state 
law to prevent the states from prospectively changing the forms and modes of proceeding in 
common law cases in federal courts—and thereby interfering with the sovereign authority of 
the United States to establish forms and modes of proceeding for its own courts. Wayman v. 
Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41, 47–48 (1825). 
277 See Ross v. Deval, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 45, 60–61 (1839);  infra notes 281–82 and accom-
panying text.  
278 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. Under the Process Act of 1792, federal 
courts had residual authority to make “such alterations and additions” to state forms of pro-
ceeding “as the said courts respectively shall in their discretion deem expedient, or to such 
regulations as the supreme court of the United States shall think proper from time to time by 
rule to prescribe to any circuit or district court concerning the same.” Act of May 8, 1792, 
ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872). 
279 See, e.g., United States v. Mundell, 27 F. Cas. 23, 30 (C.C.D. Va. 1795) (No. 15,834) 
(holding that a Virginia law governing bail in a civil action by the United States was a rule of 
decision enforceable under § 34 and thus not alterable by federal courts). 
280 In 1825 in Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 55 (1825), 
the Court considered “whether the laws of the United States authorize the Courts so to alter 
the form of the process of execution, which was in use in the Supreme Courts of the several 
States in the year 1789.” The Court, relying on Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 1, deter-
mined that the Rules of Decision Act “has no application to the practice of the Courts.” 
Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 54. Rather, as Wayman had explained, the Process Act of 
1792 “enables the several Courts of the Union to make such improvements in its forms and 
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ple, in Ross v. Deval,281 the Court devoted several paragraphs to explain-
ing why a state act specifying a time for reviving judgments was not a 
mode of proceeding (subject to the Process Act) but rather a rule of de-
cision (subject to Section 34). The distinction was important because the 
state adopted the act after the Process Act of 1792, and therefore the act 
could only apply if it was a rule of decision under Section 34. Again, the 
Process Act required static conformity with state forms of proceedings 
 
modes of proceeding, as experience may suggest.” Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 41–42. 
In Wayman, the Court concluded that the Rules of Decision Act did not require federal 
courts to apply state laws governing execution of judgment because rules of decision only 
governed prejudgment questions. Id. at 26. In other cases, the Court concluded it lacked au-
thority to reject state law on the ground that the state law at issue was a rule of decision un-
der § 34, and thus not a form or mode of proceeding subject to federal court alternation. In 
1838 in M’Neil v. Holbrook, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 84, 84–85 (1838), Holbrook brought an action 
in the United States Circuit Court for the District of Georgia on promissory notes that others 
had endorsed over to him. Under an 1810 Georgia act, an endorsement of a promissory note 
was sufficient evidence that the endorser had transferred the note. The Georgia act did not 
require proof of the endorser’s handwriting. The Supreme Court held that federal courts must 
apply the Georgia act under the Rules of Decision Act. The Court did “not perceive any suf-
ficient reason for so construing this act of congress as to exclude from its provisions those 
statutes of the several states which prescribe rules of evidence, in civil cases, in trials at 
common law.” Id. at 89. In this context, the Court considered the rule of evidence to be 
bound up with the plaintiff’s property right under the promissory note:  
Indeed, it would be difficult to make the laws of the state, in relation to the rights of 
property, the rule of decision in the circuit courts; without associating with them the 
laws of the same state, prescribing the rules of evidence by which the rights of proper-
ty must be decided. 
Id. Under the Rules of Decision Act, it concluded, the state law of evidence applied in feder-
al court: 
In some cases, the laws of the states require written evidence; in others, it dispenses 
with it, and permits the party to prove his case by parol testimony: and what rule of 
evidence could the courts of the United States adopt, to decide a question of property, 
but the rule which the legislature of the state has prescribed? The object of the law of 
congress was to make the rules of decisions, in the courts of the United States, the 
same with those of the states; taking care to preserve the rights of the United States by 
the exceptions contained in the same section. Justice to the citizens of the several 
states required this to be done; and the natural import of the words used in the act of 
congress, includes the laws in relation to evidence, as well as the laws in relation to 
property. 
Id. at 89–90. Similarly, in Fullerton v. Bank of the United States, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 604 (1828), 
Justice Johnson had explained that:  
It is not easy to draw the line between the remedy and the right, where the remedy 
constitutes so important a part of the right; nor is it easy to reduce into practice the ex-
ercise of a plenary power over contracts, without the right to declare by what evidence 
contracts shall be judicially established. 
Id. at 614. 
281 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 45, 60–61 (1839). 
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as they existed in 1792, whereas Section 34 required federal courts to 
apply state law as it existed when the cause of action arose. The Court 
thus took care to explain that the state statute was “a rule of property; 
and under the 34th section of the judiciary act, is a rule of decision for 
the Courts of the United States.”282  
Federal courts would not have undertaken these kinds of inquiries if 
they had considered themselves free to recognize or create common law 
causes of action from ambient or general law. Beginning in 1789, feder-
al courts demonstrated their awareness that Congress required them to 
apply state forms of proceeding in actions at law, and that they were not 
free to create or apply forms of proceeding from ambient law. Accord-
ingly, when disputes arose over the proper form or mode of proceeding 
in actions at law, federal courts looked to state law to resolve them. 
Moreover, on various occasions, federal courts had to decide whether 
state law qualified as a form of proceeding under the Process Act, or as a 
rule of decision under Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act. These care-
ful decisions would have been unnecessary if federal courts had power 
to create their own civil causes of action based on ambient or general 
law. 
C. Cases in Equity and Admiralty 
As discussed, the Process Acts directed federal courts to apply state 
forms of proceeding in actions at law—including actions brought within 
the federal courts’ ATS jurisdiction. Even in cases of equity and of ad-
miralty and maritime jurisdiction, however, the Acts provided federal 
courts with important direction. As explained, the Process Act of 1789 
provided that federal courts were to apply “civil law” forms of proceed-
 
282 Id. at 60. In Ross, the Court also made clear that § 34 did not apply to rules of proceed-
ing. Id. at 59 (stating that “the thirty-fourth section of the judicial act . . . ‘has no application 
to the practice of the Court’” (quoting Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 41)). This is not to 
say that it was easy in all cases to distinguish “rules of decision” from “forms of proceed-
ing.” In concept, the forms of proceeding provided the means for a plaintiff to pursue a rem-
edy for a particular kind of rights violation, while rules of decision defined the scope of the 
underlying right asserted—a line not always easy to draw. See cases cited supra note 280. In 
most cases, the Court did not have to deal with this distinction because it looked to state law 
definitions of both rights and remedies under the Process Acts and the Rule of Decision Act, 
absent a contrary act of Congress. The Court only had to deal with the distinction if there 
was a dispute over whether a borderline state law applied as it existed when the cause of ac-
tion arose, or rather in 1792; or when a court had to determine whether it had authority under 
the Process Act to update a state form of proceeding. 
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ing in cases in their equity and admiralty jurisdiction.283 The Process Act 
of 1792 modified this command by directing federal courts to look to the 
forms of proceeding used by English courts of equity and admiralty. 
Specifically, the Act provided that, in cases “of equity” and “of admiral-
ty and maritime jurisdiction,” federal courts should apply the “forms and 
modes of proceeding . . . according to the principles, rules and usages 
which belong to courts of equity and to courts of admiralty respectively, 
as contradistinguished from courts of common law.”284 Of necessity, this 
directive was more general than the directive governing actions at law. 
All states had common law courts, and all states had adopted the com-
mon law (including its forms of proceeding) as their own. By contrast, 
following the adoption of the Constitution, states no longer had admiral-
ty and maritime courts, and at least one state was thought to lack courts 
of equity. This meant that Congress could not—as it had for actions at 
law—simply instruct federal courts to borrow state forms of proceeding 
in equity and admiralty cases. 
By requiring federal courts to apply remedies and procedures general-
ly used by courts of equity and admiralty—and authorizing them to alter 
or supplement such remedies as they deemed expedient—the Act con-
ferred some discretion on federal courts to tailor such forms of proceed-
ing to the needs of federal courts. No matter how broad this discretion, 
however, Congress did not give federal courts free reign to derive or 
create causes of action from ambient general law in cases in equity or 
admiralty. Rather, Congress directed federal courts to apply traditional 
causes of action in equity and admiralty, and delegated residual authori-
ty to them to alter or amend such actions as they deemed necessary. Ac-
cordingly, even with respect to equity and admiralty cases, early acts of 
Congress and judicial practice do not support the proposition that federal 
judges had independent power to create their own causes of action on 
the basis of ambient or general law. 
In adjudicating equity cases, “federal courts generally applied a uni-
form body of . . . principles” respecting equitable remedies and proce-
dures pursuant to the Process Acts.285 In equity, as in law, the available 
 
283 Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94 (repealed 1792). 
284 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872). 
285 Collins, supra note 17, at 254. There has been some disagreement among scholars about 
whether federal courts sitting in equity followed state law to determine substantive rights. 
See id. at 282–83 (describing disagreement among scholars). Compare William Fletcher, 
The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of 
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form of proceeding or remedy defined the cause of action, and federal 
courts attempted to apply uniform remedies on the basis of traditional 
English practice. For example, in 1832 in Boyle v. Zacharie, the Su-
preme Court explained that “[t]he chancery jurisdiction given by the 
constitution and laws of the United States, is the same in all the states of 
the union,” and “the remedies in equity are to be administered, not ac-
cording to the state practice, but according to the practice of courts of 
equity in the parent country.”286  Similarly, in Mayer v. Foulkrod, Justice 
Bushrod Washington, riding circuit, explained that under the Process 
Act of 1792, federal courts applied uniform remedies in cases in equity, 
not state law remedies, as the Process Act directed federal courts to do in 
cases at law.287 
When exercising admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, federal courts 
also applied a uniform set of “forms and modes of proceeding” pursuant 
to the Process Act of 1792. In 1825, for example, in Manro v. Almeida, 
the Court considered whether a libellant could bring an in personam ac-
tion for a maritime tort within the admiralty jurisdiction of a federal dis-
trict court.288 The Court did not appeal to the ambient unwritten law to 
decide this question. Rather, the Court examined whether Congress had 
authorized district courts to hear such in personam actions within their 
admiralty jurisdiction. Under the Process Act of 1789, which directed 
federal courts to use civil law forms and modes of proceeding in cases 
within their admiralty jurisdiction,289 district courts could hear such in 
personam actions. The civil law, as the Court observed, clearly allowed 
them. In 1825, however, the governing law was the Process Act of 1792, 
which had superseded the prior Act. “The forms and modes of proceed-
ing in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” the Court ex-
plained, “are prescribed to the Courts by the second section of the Pro-
 
Marine Insurance, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1529–30, 30 n.72 (1984) (stating that “as a routine 
matter, the federal courts sitting in equity followed local state law”), with Ann Woolhandler 
& Michael G. Collins, The Article III Jury, 87 Va. L. Rev. 587, 619 (2001) (stating that “the 
substantive law that applied in federal equity proceedings was frequently either federal or 
general law rather than state law”).  
286 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 648, 648 (1832). 
287 16 F. Cas. 1231, 1234–35 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 9341) (explaining that “as to suits 
in equity, state laws, in respect to remedies . . . could have no effect whatever on the jurisdic-
tion of the court, the [Permanent Process Act of 1792] having prescribed a rule, by which the 
line of partition between the law and the equity jurisdiction of those courts is distinctly 
marked”). 
288 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 485–86 (1825). 
289 Id. at 491. 
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cess Act of 1792.”290 To decide the case, then, the Court had to construe 
the 1792 Act. “In giving a construction to the act of 1792, it is unavoid-
able, that we should consider the admiralty practice there alluded to, as 
the admiralty practice of our own country, as grafted upon the British 
practice.”291 The Court concluded from its review of admiralty and mari-
time practice in the United States and from “respectable authority” of 
“remote origin” that the in personam action was agreeable to the “prin-
ciples, rules, and usages, which belong to Courts of admiralty” under the 
Process Act of 1792.292 
In sum, in cases in equity and admiralty jurisdiction, as in cases at 
law, federal courts determined what causes of action to adjudicate not by 
reference to ambient law, but by reference to the Process Acts. When 
disputes arose about whether a particular form of action was cognizable 
in federal court, federal courts sought answers in the Process Acts. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Although the Process Acts no longer apply in federal court, the fact 
that they originally provided the causes of action in federal court has po-
tential implications for the status of federal common law causes of ac-
tion, both generally and in ATS cases. The Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain specifically sought to identify the original source of the cause 
of action in ATS cases and used its own historical findings to support 
recognition of a limited number of federal common law causes of action 
today. In a recent article, we identified two myths commonly associated 
with the ATS.293 In this Part, we will identify and discuss a third myth—
namely, that the First Congress gave federal courts jurisdiction under the 
ATS on the assumption that, in exercising this jurisdiction, they would 
derive causes of action from the general or ambient law of the era. If, as 
it stated in Sosa, the Court seeks to identify and implement the First 
Congress’s understanding of the ATS, it should reconsider its findings 
regarding the original source of the cause of action in ATS cases.294 
 
290 Id. at 488. 
291 Id. at 489–90. 
292 Id. at 491 (quoting Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872)). 
293 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, Two Myths About the Alien Tort Stat-
ute, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1609, 1609 (2014) [hereinafter Bellia & Clark, Two Myths]. 
294 Even on its own terms, Sosa raises difficult questions of translation. As others have 
noted, the Court interpreted the ATS to have assumed the existence of “the kind of ‘general 
common law’ of which Erie disapproved.” Hart & Wechsler, supra note 6, at 682. Given this 
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As explained, the ATS was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 
1789 and gave federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims 
by aliens “for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”295 Most scholars and judges have assumed that at the 
time the statute was enacted, the First Congress would have expected 
federal courts to find or create applicable causes of action on the basis of 
general common law in the exercise of ATS jurisdiction. This assump-
tion overlooks distinct acts of Congress that actually specified the causes 
of action that federal courts were to apply in actions at law. Rather than 
find or create common law causes of action in exercising their jurisdic-
tion, federal courts were to apply state forms of proceeding under the 
Process Acts. Accordingly, contrary to popular belief, Congress—rather 
than courts or ambient law—provided the cause of action in ATS cases 
from the start. This history has potential implications for how judges 
should understand the ATS today. 
This Part will explore some of these implications. First, it will explain 
how federal statutes, not ambient law, specified what causes of action 
were available in ATS cases. Second, it will explain the implications of 
this lost history for current debates over the ATS. Claims that federal 
common law supplies the cause of action in ATS cases today are anach-
ronistic because they rely on the mistaken historical premise that general 
common law originally supplied the cause of action in ATS cases. At the 
same time, claims that the ATS today encompasses causes of action au-
thorized by Congress or state law are largely reconcilable with historical 
understandings and practice. Upon analysis, the Supreme Court would 
be on firmer ground going forward were it to recognize that state law, 
rather than federal common law, defines the cause of action in ATS cas-
es. Not only would this approach be more consistent with the expecta-
tions of the First Congress and the historical understanding of the source 
of causes of action in diversity cases; it would also align more closely 
with the Court’s current restrictive approach to implied rights of action 
and federal common law. Because of its mistaken historical premises, 
the Supreme Court’s approach to the ATS in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 
and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. has been both too broad (in 
 
(erroneous) premise, the Court also could have interpreted the ATS “as a relic that preserves, 
in the domain in which it operates, a pre-Erie approach under which federal courts recognize 
a ‘spurious’ federal common law applicable only in federal courts.” Id. at 682–83.  
295 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350 (2006)). 
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recognizing federal common law causes of action) and too narrow (in 
strictly limiting the causes of action available under the ATS). 
A. The Process Acts and the ATS 
When the First Congress included the ATS in Section 9 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789, it did not assume—as Sosa suggests—that federal 
courts would exercise an inherent power in ATS cases to find or create 
causes of action on the basis of general common law. To the contrary, in 
Section 14 of the very Judiciary Act that included the ATS, Congress 
authorized federal courts to issue writs—the traditional means of seek-
ing a judicial remedy—that were “agreeable to the principles and usages 
of law.”296 Moreover, even as the First Congress enacted the Judiciary 
Act, its members were drafting more specific legislation to define the 
forms and modes of proceeding available in inferior federal court cases 
(including ATS cases).297 In the Process Act of 1789—enacted just five 
days after the ATS—Congress required federal courts to apply state 
forms and modes of proceeding in actions at law, and the traditional 
forms and modes of proceeding of courts of equity and admiralty in cas-
es within those respective jurisdictions.298 
Under the Process Acts of 1789 and 1792, a plaintiff could bring an 
action at law within a federal court’s ATS jurisdiction whenever the 
forms and modes of proceeding of the state in which the federal court sat 
afforded a remedy for the plaintiff’s alleged wrong. The ATS was rarely 
invoked by early federal courts, but two early libel actions within the 
courts’ admiralty jurisdiction—Moxon v. The Fanny299 and Bolchos v. 
Darrel300—did mention the ATS as a possible alternative ground for ju-
risdiction. Even in this context, the Process Acts—rather than ambient 
general law—provided the applicable cause of action in federal court. In 
Moxon, British owners of a ship captured by a French vessel in United 
States waters, libeled the ship, and sought restoration of it in United 
States district court.301 In Bolchos, a French privateer brought an enemy 
 
296 Judiciary Act of 1789 § 14, 1 Stat. at 82. See supra notes 153–56 and accompanying 
text (discussing § 14). 
297 See supra notes 166–67 and accompanying text (explaining that a committee was work-
ing on the Process Acts as the First Judiciary Act was being enacted). 
298 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text (describing Process Acts). 
299 17 F. Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9,895). 
300 3 F. Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). 
301 Moxon, 17 F. Cas. at 943. 
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Spanish vessel that it had captured on the high seas into port in South 
Carolina.302 There was no need in either case for the court to address the 
source of the cause of action explicitly. As discussed in Part II, the Pro-
cess Act of 1792 instructed federal courts to apply the “forms and modes 
of proceeding” in admiralty cases “according to the principles, rules and 
usages which belong to . . . courts of admiralty.”303 Because libel was so 
well recognized as an appropriate form of proceeding in prize cases, 
there was no real need for these courts to discuss it at the time. The 
Moxon and Bolchos courts entertained the libel actions not because they 
found such actions in the “brooding omnipresence” of ambient law. Ra-
ther, those courts entertained the libel actions because Congress express-
ly directed them to do so. 
As we explained in Section I.A, Congress originally adopted the ATS 
in order to give federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over claims by 
an alien for any intentional tort of violence committed by a United States 
citizen against the alien’s person or personal property.304 The tort itself 
did not have to be an “international” tort, like piracy or an assault on a 
foreign ambassador. Rather, under the law of nations at the time, the 
United States had an obligation to redress any intentional tort of vio-
lence committed by one of its citizens against the person or personal 
property of a friendly alien. If it failed to do so, then the United States 
itself became responsible for the injury and could face justified retalia-
tion by the alien’s nation.305 The ATS was the means that the First Con-
gress chose to discharge the United States’ obligation to redress injuries 
committed by United States citizens against friendly aliens.306 The ATS 
gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear cases of this kind, thus enabling 
aliens to avoid adjudication in state court where they had suffered real or 
perceived discrimination during the Confederation era. In ATS cases, 
state common law provided the underlying rights to bodily integrity and 
personal property that served as “rules of decision” under Section 34. In 
addition, state forms of proceeding defined the causes of action that fed-
eral courts would employ to redress intentional harms that U.S. citizens 
 
302 Bolchos, 3 F. Cas. at 810. 
303 Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276 (repealed 1872). 
304 See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute and Law of Nations, supra note 30; see also su-
pra note 31 and accompanying text (explaining the original purposes and meaning of the 
ATS). 
305 See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute and Law of Nations, supra note 30, at 466–94. 
306 See id. at 507–39. 
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inflicted on aliens in violation of those rights. To be clear, the problem 
with state court adjudication of alien tort claims was not the lack of a 
state law cause of action. At the time, all states had forms of proceed-
ing—typically trespass or case—to provide redress for tort injuries. Ra-
ther, the problem was the biased application of state law by state judges 
and juries—a problem that threatened to place the United States in viola-
tion of the law of nations. The ATS and the Process Acts solved this 
problem. 
In a prototypical ATS case, then, the First Congress would have ex-
pected an alien plaintiff to seek redress against an American defendant 
in federal court for an intentional tort of violence through an ordinary 
state law writ of trespass. Under the Process Acts, that writ was availa-
ble to all plaintiffs in federal courts—including aliens—so long as it was 
an appropriate form of proceeding under the law of the state in which 
the federal court sat. At the time, a writ of trespass was a standard com-
mon law writ in England. Because all of the original thirteen states 
adopted the common law of England, a writ of trespass was an available 
form of proceeding in the courts of every state (and thus in every federal 
court) in 1789. But that does not mean—as Sosa assumed—that the First 
Congress expected federal courts to draw a writ of trespass from the 
“ambient law of the era.”307 To the contrary, the First Congress specifi-
cally instructed federal courts in the Process Act to borrow the appropri-
ate cause of action from state law. 
The Sosa Court’s (mistaken) belief that the First Congress assumed 
that federal courts would find causes of action in ambient common law 
caused the Court to interpret the ATS both too broadly and too narrowly. 
The Court read the ATS too broadly by suggesting that early federal 
practice provides a basis for federal courts today to recognize causes of 
action under the ATS regardless of whether Congress or state common 
law authorizes them. On the other hand, the Court read the ATS too nar-
rowly by insisting that the First Congress would have understood ATS 
jurisdiction to reach only a small handful of notorious “international” 
tort actions.308 As noted, the Sosa Court (incorrectly) concluded that 
ATS jurisdiction originally encompassed only torts corresponding to 
three criminal offenses against the law of nations that Blackstone high-
 
307 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714. 
308 See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute and Law of Nations, supra note 30, at 540–45; 
Bellia & Clark, Two Myths, supra note 293, at 1637–40. 
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lighted—violations of rights of ambassadors, safe conduct violations, 
and piracy.309 There is no sound historical basis for this narrow reading. 
Indeed, this interpretation of the ATS would have largely negated its 
original function of providing redress to ordinary aliens for intentional 
torts of violence committed by Americans against their persons or per-
sonal property.310 
The Sosa Court’s “ambient law” theory of the cause of action in ATS 
cases not only overlooks the Process Acts, but is anachronistic insofar as 
it disregards the accepted nature of “procedural” law in 1789. In 1789, 
local law—not general law—determined the forms and modes of pro-
ceeding that were available in a sovereign’s courts, and these, in turn, 
defined the available causes of action.311 Any suggestion that courts 
found or created causes of action as a matter of general common law ig-
nores this elementary distinction between general law and local law, 
well known to lawyers, judges, and Congress at the time. Members of 
the First Congress debated whether they should adopt a uniform “local” 
federal law of procedure and remedies for federal courts, or whether 
they should instruct federal courts to borrow “local” state forms and 
modes of proceeding.312 The Process Acts were a victory for those who 
favored the latter option, at least with regard to actions at law. The Pro-
cess Acts were also at least a partial victory for those who wished to 
constrain federal courts’ powers in equity. Although the Process Acts 
did not tie federal courts down to state equity practices, they did require 
such courts to use the traditional forms and modes of proceeding of 
courts of equity. The Sosa Court’s suggestion that the First Congress 
would have expected federal courts to derive or create causes of action 
from ambient common law contradicts this history and ignores both the 
existence and specific directives of the Process Acts. 
 
309 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716–17; 4 Blackstone, supra note 94, at *68–71. 
310 Even in the narrow cases that the Sosa Court recognized, the Process Acts—rather than 
ambient law—would have supplied the causes of action. An ambassador who suffered an 
injury in violation of ambassadorial rights—such as an injury to person or property—could 
have pursued an action at law under ordinary forms of proceeding, such as trespass. A plain-
tiff alleging an assault or battery in violation of a safe conduct likewise could have brought 
an action in federal court using a writ of trespass. Even a plaintiff who invoked the ATS to 
redress an act of piracy could have used a traditional form of proceeding in admiralty such as 
libel—a form of proceeding specifically authorized by Congress in the Process Acts. 
311 See supra notes 91–98 and accompanying text (describing the difference between gen-
eral law and local law, and how forms of proceeding were local law). 
312 See supra notes 145–48 and accompanying text. 
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B. Implications for ATS Causes of Action Today 
The forgotten role of the Process Acts has several potentially im-
portant implications for ATS cases today. In Sosa, the Supreme Court 
stated that the First Congress must have assumed that general common 
law would provide the cause of action in ATS cases. From this (mistak-
en) premise, the Court suggested that federal courts exercising ATS ju-
risdiction today may “recognize private claims under federal common 
law” for a narrow range of international law violations.313 This sugges-
tion lacks support in historical understandings and practice. As in all 
cases within federal court jurisdiction, the Process Acts specified the ap-
plicable causes of action absent more specific direction from Congress. 
This is a central point for understanding the early operation of federal 
courts. Congress itself authorized the causes of action that were availa-
ble in federal courts. Federal courts did not exercise judicial power to 
divine or create causes of action as a matter of “general common law” or 
“ambient law.” Accordingly, the actual historical practice of early feder-
al courts under the Process Acts provides no support for the Court’s cur-
rent position that federal courts may recognize federal common law 
causes of action in ATS cases. If valid, this position must find its justifi-
cation elsewhere. 
On the other hand, those who argue that courts exercising ATS juris-
diction today should adjudicate causes of action created by state law or 
foreign law may find support for their position in federal judicial prac-
tice under early acts of Congress.314 In 1789, lawyers, Congress, and 
federal courts understood causes of action to be a matter of local “proce-
dural” or “remedial” law. Accordingly, the law of the forum sovereign 
governed the causes of action that were available in its courts. In early 
diversity cases (including foreign diversity and ATS cases), the Process 
Acts instructed federal courts to apply whatever causes of action were 
available in state forms of proceeding. Over the ensuing century, legisla-
tures and courts came to regard causes of action to be a matter of “sub-
stance” rather than “procedure.” On this understanding, Congress au-
thorized the introduction of uniform rules of civil procedure in federal 
courts with the adoption of the Rules Enabling Act in 1934. The Su-
 
313 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732. 
314 See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Future of Human Rights Litigation After Kiobel, 89 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1749, 1751 (2014) (arguing that the most likely avenues of relief in fu-
ture ATS cases will be causes of action created by state or foreign law). 
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preme Court promulgated such rules in 1938. Rule 2 provided there is 
“one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’”315 This rule not only 
abolished the distinction between legal and equitable actions, but also 
abandoned any reliance by federal courts on the distinct forms of action 
used in different states. 
The establishment of uniform rules of procedure for federal courts, 
however, did not purport to change the substantive law—including, as 
they were understood by this time, the causes of action—applied in fed-
eral courts.316 Section 34 of the First Judiciary Act (again, known today 
as the “Rules of Decision Act”) directed federal courts to apply the sub-
stantive law of the states absent federal law to the contrary. According to 
the Act: “The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or 
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or 
provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the 
courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.”317 The Supreme 
Court made clear in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins that, under both this 
provision and the Constitution, “[e]xcept in matters governed by the 
Constitution or Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the 
law of the State.”318 This means that, even today, federal courts continue 
to apply state law causes of action absent contrary federal law. In addi-
tion, under the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 
federal courts apply state choice of law rules to determine the applica-
tion of foreign law, including causes of action created by foreign law.319 
At present, then, because legislatures and courts consider causes of 
action to be substantive rather than procedural, federal courts may apply 
state causes of action—and, under state choice of law rules, foreign 
causes of action—under the Rules of Decision Act. Interestingly, alt-
hough the basis of authority has changed, the result in ATS cases today 
under Erie and the Rules of Decision Act would be largely the same as it 
would have been in 1789 under the Process Act: Federal courts exercis-
ing ATS jurisdiction would look to state law to determine the availabil-
ity of a cause of action in the absence of a federal statute (such as the 
 
315 See supra note 226. 
316 Indeed, the Rules Enabling Act itself provided that the rules promulgated under the Act 
“shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2012). 
317 Id. § 1652. 
318 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). 
319 313 U.S. 487, 496–97 (1941). 
BELLIA&CLARK_BOOK (DO NOT DELETE) 4/14/2015  3:49 PM 
2015] The Original Source of the Cause of Action 685 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991320) expressly granting a specific 
federal cause of action. 
All of this suggests that the Supreme Court—to the extent that it seeks 
to implement the expectations of the First Congress—should revisit 
some of the conclusions it reached regarding the ATS in Sosa and Ki-
obel. First, if historical meaning matters, the Court should abandon the 
interrelated ideas that federal common law provides the causes of action 
available in ATS cases, and that courts should strictly limit the available 
causes of action by reference to certain eighteenth-century paradigms. 
There was no such thing as true federal common law in 1789; it is a 
twentieth century construct.321 Accordingly, federal courts seeking to 
implement the original meaning of the ATS would not have exercised a 
power to create (and limit) the available causes of action as a matter of 
federal common law. Instead, federal courts would have looked to state 
law to define the applicable causes of action in the exercise of their ATS 
jurisdiction (just as they do today in the exercise of their ordinary diver-
sity jurisdiction). Moreover, if the Sosa Court had confined the ATS—in 
accordance with its original meaning—to suits by aliens against U.S. cit-
izens,322 then it would have had no need to impose strict limits on the 
kinds of causes of action that federal courts could adjudicate under the 
ATS.323 In 1789, any intentional tort of violence committed by a U.S. 
citizen against a friendly alien would have qualified as a tort in violation 
of the law of nations and would have triggered the United States’ obliga-
tion under such law to redress the harm. On this view, the ATS would 
have provided redress to all friendly aliens who were the victims of such 
torts. 
Abandoning Sosa’s approach would also be more consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s current restrictive approach to implied rights of action 
and federal common law because it would relieve federal courts of the 
difficult and controversial task of crafting—and limiting—federal com-
mon law causes of action in ATS cases. In recent decades, the Court has 
all but halted the recognition of implied federal causes of action by re-
 
320 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012)). 
321 See Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1681, 1696–97 (2008). 
322 See Bellia & Clark, Alien Tort Statute and Law of Nations, supra note 30, at 529. 
323 The Court would also have no need to confront the difficult question of subject matter 
jurisdiction that arises when all parties to an ATS suit are aliens—a question the Court has 
yet to address or resolve. See Bellia & Clark, Two Myths, supra note 293, at 1640–41, 41 
n.177. 
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quiring congressional intent to create them in the underlying statute.324 
Similarly, the Court disfavors the creation of federal common law caus-
es of action because the practice raises both separation of powers and 
federalism concerns.325 In the case of the ATS, the Process Act refutes 
the idea “that the ATS was intended not simply as a jurisdictional grant, 
but as authority for the creation of a new cause of action for torts in vio-
lation of international law.”326 Thus, an implied cause of action would 
not have been available under the ATS as an original matter, and would 
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s current approach to implied 
causes of action.  
Recognition of a federal common law cause of action outside the con-
text of implied federal rights of action, moreover, has been even more 
difficult and controversial in recent decades. The Supreme Court has 
almost never recognized a federal common law cause of action beyond 
the context of the ATS.327 Even recognition of federal common law de-
fenses has been controversial in recent years.328 Justice Brennan, dissent-
ing from the Court’s recognition of a federal common law defense for 
federal military contractors, summarized the reasons why the Court has 
been reluctant to recognize both causes of action and defenses as a mat-
ter of federal common law.329 In his view, the Court has rightly “empha-
 
324 See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287–88 (2001). 
325 See infra note 327 and accompanying text; cf. Caleb Nelson, The Legitimacy of (Some) 
Federal Common Law, 101 Va. L. Rev. 1 (2015) (explaining that some federal common law 
may be legitimate on topics that lie beyond the reach of state law). 
326 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713; see also id. at 724 (stating that “the ATS is a jurisdictional stat-
ute creating no new causes of action”). 
327 The most famous example is Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 
(1957), in which the Supreme Court held that a jurisdictional provision of a federal labor law 
statute authorized federal courts to fashion federal common law to enforce collective bar-
gaining agreements. More recently, however, the Court rejected requests by the FDIC for the 
creation of federal common law causes of action permitting the FDIC to sue a failed bank’s 
former law firm, see O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 83 (1994), and the bank’s 
former officers and directors, see Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 217–18 (1997); see also 
United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 302, 316–17 (1947) (rejecting the United 
States’ request that the Court recognize a federal common law cause of action permitting the 
United States to sue a company for the loss of a soldier’s services due to the company’s neg-
ligence). 
328 The Court famously recognized a federal common law defense in favor of the United 
States in Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943). More recently, 
a closely divided Court recognized a federal common law defense in favor of military con-
tractors sued under state law for design defects of the products they supply to the United 
States. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504–08 (1988). 
329 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515–32 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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sized that federal common law can displace state law in ‘few and re-
stricted’ instances,” because it is in tension with both federalism and 
separation of powers.330 The creation of a new federal contractor defense 
did not fall within any of these “few and established” enclaves, and thus 
amounted the exercise of legislative rather than judicial power.331 As he 
put it, “I would leave that exercise of legislative power to Congress, 
where our Constitution places it.”332 
Finally, rejection of federal common law causes of action under the 
ATS would have obviated the Supreme Court’s novel reliance on the 
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law in Kiobel. 
Because the Sosa Court suggested that the cause of action in ATS cases 
constituted a form of federal common law, the application of such law to 
the conduct of aliens in the territory of another country raised the same 
kinds of foreign policy concerns as the extraterritorial application of 
federal statutes. Accordingly, the Court felt compelled to extend the pre-
sumption beyond substantive federal statutes to substantive federal 
common law causes of action under the ATS. This novel extension of 
the presumption would have been unnecessary had the Court recognized 
that the nature of the cause of action in ATS cases was and remains no 
different from the nature of the cause of action in ordinary diversity cas-
es. 
If the Supreme Court had properly interpreted the ATS as a special-
ized form of diversity jurisdiction—in accordance with its original 
meaning—the source of the cause of action in ATS cases presumably 
would have followed the same path as the source of the cause of action 
in diversity cases. In the early decades of the republic, federal courts ex-
ercising both forms of jurisdiction would have applied state causes of 
action under the Process Acts. In light of Erie, the Rules of Decision 
Act, and the adoption of the federal rules of civil procedure, federal 
courts eventually came to apply state causes of action in diversity cases 
as substantive state law.333 Had the Supreme Court interpreted the ATS 
as a form of foreign diversity jurisdiction, aliens injured by U.S. citizens 
today would have the option of invoking either ATS jurisdiction (with 
no amount-in-controversy requirement) or foreign diversity jurisdiction 
 
330 Id. at 518 (quoting Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963)). 
331 But see Clark, supra note 2, at 1368–75 (suggesting that Boyle might be justified as an 
instance of constitutional preemption of state law). 
332  Boyle, 487 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
333 See Bradford R. Clark, Erie’s Constitutional Source, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 1289 (2007). 
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(with an amount-in-controversy requirement), as they saw fit. This un-
derstanding would allow aliens to sue Americans for any intentional 
torts to their person or personal property, whether they occurred within 
the United States or in other countries (using the well-established com-
mon law doctrine of transient torts).334 Finally, this understanding would 
relieve federal courts of the difficult and controversial task of recogniz-
ing (and limiting) federal common law causes of action in ATS cases. 
CONCLUSION 
In recent debates regarding the meaning of the ATS, courts and schol-
ars have suggested that early federal courts found or created causes of 
action on the basis of general common law. The Supreme Court en-
dorsed this idea in Sosa. Early federal courts, however, neither found 
causes of action in ambient common law nor exercised any power to 
create common law causes of action. In the Process Acts, early Con-
gresses directed federal courts to apply the same causes of action that lo-
cal state courts applied in cases at law, and to apply traditional causes of 
action in equity and admiralty cases. Congress thereby adopted “local” 
federal forms and modes of proceeding defining the causes of action that 
were available in federal courts. Congress did not leave federal courts 
free to find or create them on their own. 
Recognizing the original source of the cause of action in early federal 
courts has important implications for how the ATS should operate to-
day—especially given that the Supreme Court has self-consciously 
sought to implement its original meaning. The Court has suggested that 
today federal courts may create a limited number of federal common law 
causes of action for cases within ATS jurisdiction because early federal 
courts would have applied causes of action found in ambient common 
law. The premise of this claim lacks support in—and is actually contra-
dicted by—the historical record. The same Congress that enacted the 
ATS required federal courts to adopt state causes of action in cases with-
in that jurisdiction. If the Court still seeks to implement the expectations 
of the First Congress and remain faithful to historical practice in future 
cases, the Court should abandon the erroneous assumptions it made in 
Sosa and take seriously claims that state law and foreign law (under rel-
evant choice-of-law rules) now define the applicable causes of action in 
ATS cases. This approach would not only better fulfill the Court’s desire 
 
334 See Bellia & Clark, Two Myths, supra note 293, at 1636. 
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to apply the original meaning of the statute; it also would better align 
with the evolution of the source of the cause of action in diversity cases 
and with the Court’s current approach to implied rights of action and 
federal common law. 

